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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper seeks to explain the varying, and sometimes intriguing, outcomes of the past three revisions 
of the Treaty concerning the Community’s Common Commercial Policy. How can the failure to 
extend Community competencies at the Amsterdam IGC be explained in one of the most integrated 
fields despite substantial pressures stemming from the changing international trade agenda? Why has 
the last Treaty revision managed to achieve considerable progress concerning the extension of 
Community competence in contested areas, which the previous three IGCs failed to bring about? The 
paper argues that six explanatory factors can account for these outcomes: (1) functional pressures; (2) 
the role of supranational institutions; (3) socialisation, deliberation and learning processes; (4) 
exogenous pressures; (5) the role of organised interests; and (6) countervailing forces. The framework, 
especially through its dialectical nature (combining both dynamics and countervailing factors), also 
enables us to account for more specific aspects of decision outcomes. In addition, I suggest that for 
dynamics to have an impact structural and more agency-based pressures have to occur concurrently. 
  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
During the last three revisions of the Treaty, we could witness rather differing, and to some 
extent, puzzling decision outcomes concerning the Common Commercial Policy (CCP). For 
example, how can the failure to extend (or perhaps even the roll back
1) of Community 
competencies at the IGC 1996-97 in one of the Community’s oldest and most integrated areas 
be explained? Given the changes of the world economy and certain linkages to the internal 
market, it appeared – at least from some distance – that considerable exogenous as well as 
functional pressures could instigate a reform of the CCP. The latest Treaty revision exercise is 
equally interesting and intriguing. Why has the 2002-2004 Treaty revision managed to 
achieve something like a break-through concerning the extension of competence to the 
Community in contested areas, such as services, intellectual property and investment, which 
the Maastricht, Amsterdam and (to a lesser degree)  Nice  IGCs  failed  to  bring  about?                        
  In order to answer these questions and to account for the outcomes of the last three 
Treaty revisions more generally I have developed a framework which draws on functional-
endogenous pressures; the role of supranational institutions; socialisation, deliberation and 
learning processes; exogenous pressures; the role of organised interests; and countervailing 
                                                 
1 The roll-back view has, to a certain extent, been advocated by Meunier and Nicolaïdis (1999).   2
forces. These pressures are interconnected in several ways and cannot always be clearly 
separated from each other. 
I thus focus on a traditional research question in the area of EU integration studies, i.e. 
explaining outcomes of EU decision-making. In the last decade many researchers have shifted 
their attention to questions such as the nature of the EU political system, the social and 
political consequences of the integration process and the normative dimension of European 
integration. However, the issue of explaining outcomes of EU decision-making, which has 
occupied scholars since the 1950s, is still a very important one. The ongoing salience of this 
question partly stems from the continuing disagreement among analysts as regards the most 
relevant factors accounting for the dynamics and standstills of the European integration 
process and certain segments of it. 
  The paper proceeds as follows: First, my theoretical framework is specified, including 
its underlying assumptions and explanatory factors. The subsequent section contains my case 
analysis of the 1996-97, 2000 and 2002-04 Intergovernmental Conferences. Finally, I draw 
some conclusions from my findings. 
  
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Underlying assumptions 
 
While (strongly) drawing on neofunctionalist theory (e.g. Haas 1958; Lindberg, 1963), my 
theoretical framework departs from, and further develops, this theoretical strand in several 
ways.
2 This section focuses on specifying my core assumptions and explanatory factors. I 
have discussed the development and modification of neofunctionalist theory at length 
elsewhere (cf. e.g. Niemann, 1998, 2004, 2005 forthcoming). 
My approach does not strive for ontological purity. While eschewing arch-rationalist 
and hardcore reflectivist ontological extremes, my account takes on board the (empirical) 
insight that agents tend to be subject to different social logics and rationalities and that they 
                                                 
2 For example, as partly pointed out below, a self-understanding as a grand theory is rejected; an emphasis 
mainly on agents is replaced by a more equal ontological status between structure and agency; integration is not 
seen as a dynamic process but as a dialectical process; the automaticity of spillover maxim is discarded; 
assumptions concerning the end of ideology, unabated growth in Europe, and a political community as the end-
state of the integration process have been discarded. Also, neofunctionalists did not systematically formulate a 
basic ontology (but cf. Haas, 2001). Their mainly ‘soft’ rational-choice ontology with some reflexive elements 
has been complemented by a more explicitly ‘soft’ constructivist ontology (see below). For a more detailed 
account of the issues mentioned in this footnote, see Niemann (2004, 2005 forthcoming).   3
combine several modes of action in their behaviour. The recent literature suggests that the 
rational choice logic of consequentialism and the more constructivist logics of 
appropriateness and arguing coexist in the real world (cf. e.g. March and Olsen, 1998, pp. 
952-953; Checkel, 1999, p. 546; Risse, 2000: esp. pp. 1-9). There are different interpretations 
concerning the relationships between these logics. My ontological position is that these logics 
are activated under different conditions and in different environments, but that the 
relationship between the rational-choice logic and the two more constructivist ones tends to 
be a developmental one: agents are more likely to enter into new relationships following an 
instrumental rationale, but tend to develop certain norms and identities and may change their 
preferences as a result of their experience and interaction.  
However, my ontology can be further specified by delimiting the frame within which 
these logics take place. Some of the hardcore rational-choice
3 maxims are loosened in my 
framework, while two core rational-choice assumptions are recognised: firstly, agents are 
rational, i.e. they choose that option which they believe best fulfils their purposes. Preferences 
do not result from random choice but reflect deliberate behaviour. Secondly, actors are 
basically egoistic. They base their behaviour on consequential calculations of self-interests 
and try to enhance their utility through strategic exchanges. However, some other rational-
choice tenets cannot be taken on board. Assumptions of preferences as consistent, stable and 
exogenously-given are relaxed. Moreover, rational-choice presumptions of intentions as 
causes determining outcomes and suppositions of formally predictable outcome patterns are 
dropped. In addition and partly following from the above, the unequivocally materialist 
philosophy of science – according to which behaviour is the simple response to the forces of 
physics that act on material objects from the outside – that characterises many rational-choice 
accounts is not shared. On the other hand, the reflectivist or postmodernist extreme (e.g. 
Rosenau, 1992; Alexander, 1995) is also dismissed. According to this ontological stance, it 
makes no sense to assume the independent existence of an external reality, as reality cannot 
be known outside human language. There is no way of deciding whether statements 
correspond to reality except by means of other statements. Hence, reality, under such 
ontology, is turned into linguistic conventions. 
In contrast, my ontological position is situated in between these two poles. While 
acknowledging that there is a real (material) world out there, which offers resistance when we 
act upon it, behaviour is only to some extent shaped by physical reality. Instead, agents’ 
                                                 
3 On rational-choice theory and its various assumptions, see for example: Brennan (1997: esp. 91-104); and 
Green and Shapiro (1994: 14-17).   4
capacity for learning and reflection has an impact on the way in which they attach meaning to 
the material world. Agents cognitively frame or construct the world according to their 
knowledge, norms, experience and understandings. Hence, actors’ interests and identities are 
moulded and constituted by both cognitive and material structures. Their preferences are 
shaped by social interaction and the evolving structures, norms and rules of the domestic and 
the EU polity (i.e. membership matters) rather than exogenously given. Collective actions are 
not merely the aggregation of individual preferences, but individual actors’ objectives are 
influenced by and derivative from the social group with which an agent interacts and 
identifies. And because agents are assumed to have the capacity to learn, their preferences are 
subject to change rather than stable, given evolving social structures and varying actor 
constellations in the real world. The nature of being is thus viewed as transformative.  
As for the ontological status of structure and agency, my framework regards the 
properties of both structure and agency as very significant to explaining social and political 
processes and, for that matter, European integration. It dismisses both structural determinism 
and agency-centred voluntarism. Instead, my framework embraces the concept of 
structuration which emphasises the interdependence of structures and agents (cf. Giddens 
1984). Structure and agency mutually constitute each other. Structure has a dual nature. It 
enters simultaneously into the constitution of the agent and social practices, and exists in the 
generating moments of this constitution. Agency, however, is not reduced into servants of 
structure. They have created structural properties in the first place and can potentially change 
any aspect of structure. Agents act upon both structures and their own preconceived interests. 
Hence, this framework assigns agency and structure an equal ontological status. 
Additional underlying – and partly overlapping – basic assumptions can be specified: 
firstly, as conceptualised by most EU integration scholars these days, integration is 
understood here as a process. This differs from intergovernmentalist accounts that tend to 
look at isolated events. Secondly, this process is influenced by multiple and diverse actors 
(and structures). States are not unified actors and certainly not the only actors that matter in 
EU decision-making processes. Thirdly, once established institutions can take on a life of 
their own and are difficult to control by those who created them. Fourthly and closely related, 
there is considerable scope for unintended consequences, as decisions taken by national 
politicians are often taken under circumstances of uncertainty, imperfect knowledge or under 
time pressure which restricts the possibility of long-term purposive behaviour (cf. e.g. 
Pierson, 1996). Fifthly, not all games played between actors are zero-sum games. Interaction 
is often better characterised by positive sum-games and a ‘supranational’ style of decision-  5
making in which actors attain agreement by means of upgrading common interests or by 
arriving at mutual understandings. Sixthly, functional interdependencies between issues and 
sectors spur the propensity for further or more intensified cooperation/integration (cf. Haas 
1958).  Finally, as will be further elaborated below, integration is assumed to be dialectical 
process, both subject to dynamics and countervailing forces. 
 
 
Explanatory factors 
 
Based on the above assumptions and my prior research findings (e.g. Niemann, 1998, 2000), a 
number of explanatory variables have been derived, which are hypothesised to explain change 
in decision outcomes (dependent variable). The subsequent pressures are intertwined in 
several ways and cannot always be neatly separated from each other. The first five factors 
(functional-endogenous pressures, exogenous pressures, the role of organised interests, 
socialisation, deliberation and learning and the role of supranational institutions are 
hypothesised as dynamics, while the sixth factor (countervailing forces) goes against these 
integrational logics.
4 
 
Functional-endogenous pressures 
 
Functional-endogenous pressures come about when an original goal can be assured only by 
taking further integrative actions (cf. Lindberg, 1963, p. 10). The basis for the development of 
these pressures is the interdependence of policy sectors and issue areas. Individual sectors and 
issues tend to be so interdependent in modern polities and economies that it is likely to be 
difficult to isolate them from the rest (cf. Haas, 1958, pp. 297, 383). Endogenous-functional 
pressures, thus encompass the tensions, contradictions and interdependencies arising from 
within (or which are closely related to) the European integration project, and its policies, 
politics and polity, which induce policy-makers to take additional integrative steps in order to 
achieve their original objectives. 
  Functional pressures constitute a structural component in my explanatory framework. 
These pressures have a propensity for causing further integration, as intentional actors tend to 
be persuaded by the functional tensions and contradictions. However, functional structures do 
                                                 
4 However, the separation between dynamics and countervailing forces reflects tendencies. Factors that are held 
to be dynamics may, on occasion, turn into countervailing forces, and vice versa, as my empirical analysis will 
indicate.   6
not ‘determine’ actors’ behaviour in any mechanical or predictable fashion. Endogenous-
functional structures contain an important element of human agreement. Agents have to 
perceive functional structures as plausible and somewhat compelling. They need to conceive 
of them as (strong) pressures in order to act upon them. (Functional) structures and (national, 
supranational and other) actors are interdependent. These structures enter into the constitution 
of actors (i.e. influence their preferences) and also, to some extent, exist from the generating 
moments of this constitution, as actors tend to reproduce structures under the impact of their 
interests that have been moulded by structures. However, actors are not structural idiots. They 
have created structures in the first place and can potentially change them at any time. And, in 
doing so, there is a (considerable) degree of non-structural autonomy.  
 
Exogenous pressures 
 
Exogenous pressures encompass those factors that originate outside the integration process 
itself, i.e. that are exogenous to it. It is an attempt to take account of the fact that changes in, and 
pressures from, the external political and economic environment affect the behaviour of national 
and supranational actors and also influence EU and domestic structures. This is to recognise that 
the Community and its development need to be viewed in the global context. It is argued here 
that exogenous factors – although they can constitute an obstacle to further integration
   – 
generally encourage or provoke further integrative steps.
5  
There are several logics behind hypothesising exogenous factors as primarily a dynamic 
of integration. Firstly, some exogenous events and developments are viewed as threats or 
shocks. It has been pointed out in the literature that perceived threats are conducive to the 
integration of regional blocks. This has been illustrated, for example, concerning the Cold War 
origins of the European Communities (cf. e.g. Milward and Sørensen, 1993; Neuss, 2000). The 
rationale behind the integrative impact of external shocks and threats is that in such instances 
close cooperation partners (or Member States of an integration project) tend to rally together 
and find common solutions. One particular but frequent type of threat is competition between 
states and/or regions. Perceived competition with other international players tends to foster EU 
Member States to pool their strengths and resources through further cooperation/integration 
with the intention of advancing the Union’s competitive position. Examples of the integrative 
impact of external (mainly US and Japanese economic) competition in the history of European 
                                                 
5 While Hill (1993), for instance, has emphasised the integrative dimension of external factors, George (1991) 
has underlined, for example, that external factors can have both disintegrative and integrative effects.    7
integration include agreement on the 1992 programme (Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989) or the 
development of industrial and high technology policies (Peterson, 1991, 1992). 
A second logic of external dynamics is grounded in the nature of many international 
problems and their perception. Regional integration is often viewed as a more effective buffer 
against disadvantageous or uncertain external developments. This is related to the perception 
that many problems go beyond the governance potential of individual Member States. 
Phenomena and processes such as globalisation, migration, environmental destruction or 
international terrorism require a common approach (e.g. of integration partners) in order to 
tackle them with some success (cf. George and Bache, 2000, p. 39). This exogenous aspect is 
linked to, and further explained by, an endogenous one. European democratic nation-states 
depend on the delivery of economic, social and other well-being to their people. Increasingly, 
due to regional interdependencies and more global problems, they lose their power to deliver 
these goods. To circumvent the decrease in influence over their territory, national governments 
tend to cooperate more closely on the European level (cf. Wessels, 1997, pp. 286ff). 
  Thirdly, Schmitter has pointed out that once a regional integration project has got under 
way and developed common policies ‘participants will find themselves compelled - regardless 
of their original intentions - to adopt common policies vis-à-vis nonparticipant third parties. 
Members will be forced to hammer out a collective external position (and in the process are 
likely to rely increasingly on the new central institutions to do it)’ (Schmitter, 1969, p. 165). 
Schmitter points to the incentive of forging common positions and policies to increase the 
collective bargaining power of the Community vis-à-vis the outside world as well as 
involuntary motives such as the demands of the extra-Community environment reacting to 
(successful) developments within the regional integration project. Hence, there is an 
endogenous logic linking internal and external events.  
Exogenous factors are often closely linked to, and not always separable from, 
endogenous ones. Like functional pressures, they are conceptualised here as essentially 
structural in nature. However, as all structural pressures exogenous ones are also closely 
intertwined with the property of agents. This implies that actors’ preferences cannot be treated 
as given. The external environment/system, just like EU membership, to some extent, 
constitutes decision-makers’ preferences. This is difficult to trace in empirical analysis. One 
indicator for the significance of such, often ‘invisible’, influences of the wider international 
context is the impact of internationally prevailing policy paradigms and discourses.
6  
                                                 
6 For example, the gradual acceptance of (originally Anglo-Saxon) neo-liberal economic ideas by West European 
elites has certainly facilitated agreement on the Single European Market and the liberalisation of many policy 
sectors (cf. e.g. Green Cowles, 1995, p. 521).   8
 
The role of organised interests 
 
Organised interests are hypothesised as a dynamic because in many policy areas they tend to 
perceive that their substantial interests are better served at the European level, through EU 
solutions and EU institutional involvement. Two sub-hypotheses are inherent in this factor. 
Firstly, that groups gradually focus more of their attention, lobbying and organisation onto the 
European level with the growing competence of supranational institutions and the increased 
number of policy sectors governed (at least partially) by the European level (e.g. Mazey and 
Richardson, 1993; Bindi Calussi, 1992).  
Secondly, interest groups tend to gradually promote further integration, as they 
become aware of the benefits of European level cooperation in their policy area. Such 
interest-based learning is fostered, for example, because societal (especially business) groups 
benefit from one set rather than fifteen or twenty-five sets of rules and the advantages of 
larger markets and economies of scale, more generally (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997). 
Moreover, in external trade policy, enhanced competencies of supranational institutions, for 
instance concerning trade in services, (would) allow the EU to negotiate more effectively on 
the international level – i.e. arrive at its internal positions and speak with one voice more 
easily – and thus benefit European service industries more extensively from external trade 
liberalisation, an area where many European firms are rather competitive. In addition, interest 
groups tend to be inclined to support further integration due to functional logics pointed out 
above, which induce them to seek European solutions in order to solve contradictions and 
tensions from prior integrational steps (Haas 1958).  
While functional spillover pressures, pull-factors from European integration and the 
EU institutional development are regarded as significant factors influencing interest group 
behaviour, other structures such as exogenous pressures and domestic constraints also 
influence the organised interests. The role of organised interests mainly concerns non-
governmental elites, but may include governmental elites (which are primarily hypothesised 
in the next section) for example when forming part of advocacy coalitions to which the above 
integrative rationales may also apply (cf. Niemann 2004, 2005). 
 
 
 
   9
Socialisation, deliberation and learning processes among (mainly governmental) elites 
 
The general hypothesis of this section is that socialisation, deliberation and learning processes 
do take place in the Community environment and that these processes tend to facilitate 
cooperative decision-making as well as consensus formation and thus contribute to more 
progressive and integrative decision outcomes. The first point worth noting in that respect is 
that the gradual increase of working groups and sub-committees on the European level has led 
to a complex system of (bureaucratic) interpenetration that brings thousands of national civil 
servants in frequent contact with each other and with Commission officials on a recurrent 
basis. This provides an important foundation for such processes, not least due to the 
development of mutual trust and a certain esprit de corps among officials in Community 
forums (cf. Lindberg, 1963; Lewis, 1998). The underlying assumption is that the duration and 
intensity of interaction have a (positive) bearing on socialisation and learning processes.  
It is maintained here that not only the quantity, but also the quality of interaction 
constitutes a significant factor in terms of inducing socialisation and learning processes. 
Deeply-rooted genuine learning cannot be sufficiently explained through incentives/interests 
of egoistic actors (cf. Checkel in Checkel and Moravcsik, 2001, p. 225, 242). More ‘complex’ 
learning goes beyond interest-based learning (cf. previous section), i.e. the adaptation or 
redefinition of means or strategies to reach basically unaltered and unquestioned goals. 
Instead, it constitutes changed behaviour as a result of challenged and scrutinised 
assumptions, values and objectives.
7 Furthermore, if we want to understand and explain social 
behaviour and learning, we need to take communication and language into greater 
consideration. It is through speech that actors make sense of the world and attribute meaning 
to their actions. In order to account for the quality of interaction, to provide a more 
fundamental basis for reflexive learning and to integrate the role of communication more 
thoroughly, I will draw on the notions of communicative action and deliberation. 
The concept of communicative action, as devised by Habermas (1981a, b, 1986), 
refers to the interaction of people whose actions are coordinated not via egocentric 
calculations of success but through acts of reaching understanding (Verständigung). In 
communicative action, participants are not primarily oriented to achieving their own 
individual success; they pursue their individual objectives under the condition that they can 
coordinate or harmonise their plans of action on the basis of shared definitions of the 
                                                 
7 I have based my distinction between deeply-rooted, reflexive or complex learning, on the one hand, and 
adaptation or incentive-based learning, on the other hand, on  Nye (1987: 380) who used the terms ‘complex’ 
and ‘simple’ learning.   10
situation. Agents engaging in communicative action seek to reach understanding about valid 
behaviour. Habermas distinguishes between three validity claims that can be challenged in 
discourse: first, that a statement is true, i.e. conforms to the facts; second, that a speech act is 
right with respect to the existing normative context; and third, that the manifest intention of 
the speaker is truthful, i.e. that s/he means what s/he says. Communicative behaviour, which 
aims at reasoned understanding, counterfactually assumes the existence of an “ideal speech 
situation”, in which nothing but the better argument counts and actors attempt to convince 
each other (and are open to persuasion) with regard to the three types of validity claims. By 
arguing in relation to standards of truth, rightness and sincerity, agents have a basis for 
judging what constitutes reasonable choices of action, through which they can reach 
agreement (Habermas, 1981a., p. 149). Where communicative rationality prevails, actors’ 
pursuit of their interests is conditioned by their perception of valid behaviour according to 
these three standards. When engaging in communicative action, agents do not seek to 
maximise their interests, but to challenge and substantiate the validity claims that are inherent 
in their interest. Interests may also change in the process of communicative interaction, as 
actors challenge each others’ causal and principled beliefs.  
While agents bargain in strategic interaction, they discuss, deliberate, reason, argue 
and persuade in communicative interaction. Actors engaging in communicative behaviour 
have the potential to undergo more profound learning processes. Rather than merely adapting 
the means to achieve basically unchanged goals, as in strategic interaction, they redefine their 
very priorities and preferences in validity-seeking processes aimed at reaching mutual 
understanding. Somewhere between hard bargaining and communicative action lies what has 
been referred to as ‘rhetorical action’, the strategic use of norm-based arguments 
(Schimmelfennig, 2001, pp. 62ff). Actors whose self-interested preferences are in line with 
certain prevailing norms or values can use these argumentatively to add cheap legitimacy to 
their position and delegitimise the position of their opponents. Whereas communicative actors 
attempt to reach reasoned understanding, rhetorical actors seek to strengthen their own 
position strategically and are not prepared to be persuaded by the better argument. 
 Once Community/collaborative norms
8 have become internalised by actors, another 
mode of action becomes increasingly relevant: normatively-regulated action. This type of 
behaviour refers to members of a social group who orient their action towards common values 
or norms which they have thoroughly internalised (Habermas, 1981a, p. 127). The individual 
                                                 
8 Norms are defined here as ‘collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity’. See 
Katzenstein (1996, p. 5).     11
actor complies with a norm when, in a given situation, the conditions are present to which the 
norm has application. All members of a group for whom a given norm has validity may 
expect of one another that, in a certain situation, they will carry out the actions proscribed. 
Norms are taken for granted. They are not enacted out of choice, but out of habit. Collective 
understandings about appropriate behaviour (i.e. norms) make an impact because ‘the 
individual intentionality that each person has is derived from the collective intentionality that 
they share’.
9  
Communicative action is granted greater potential for deep-rooted learning than 
rhetorical action, and especially hard-bargaining. And socialised actors are more likely to 
engage in norm-regulated and communicative action than agents who have not undergone 
these common processes. However, consistent with my ontological position, agents combine 
all these (complementary) modes of action in their behaviour. Hence, we cannot expect 
constant learning. Nor can we expect unidirectional learning, as the EU level is not the single 
source of learning, with the domestic and international realms also constituting (important) 
socialisation sources.  
While socialisation, deliberation and learning processes are mainly about the social 
interaction of agents, this pressure also links actors to broader structures. For example, 
endogenous-functional, exogenous, domestic and EU institutional structures become part of 
decision-makers’ norms and values throughout processes of socialisation and learning. In 
addition, actors who engage in communicative action, in their quest to arrive at the most 
‘valid’ solution to the problems at hand, tend to be more open-minded, i.e. beyond the narrow 
confines of their preconceived interests, and are thus more inclined to also consider arguments 
derived from the (wider) structural environment. Put differently, during communicative 
interaction agents are likely to uncover structural factors, which are subsequently incorporated 
in their deliberations. Socialisation, deliberation and learning thus (also) works as an interface 
between structure and agency. 
  
The role of supranational institutions 
 
The final dynamic specified here is the integrative role played by supranational institutions. 
Several underlying factors point to the plausibility of hypothesising supranational institutions 
as promoters of intensified cooperation and integration. Firstly, there is the likelihood of 
                                                 
 
9 See Searle (1995: 25). Concepts like bargaining, communicative action and normatively-regulated action 
should be seen as ideal types which do not often appear in their pure form.   12
unintended consequences, as decisions taken by domestic politicians are often taken under 
circumstances of uncertainty, imperfect knowledge or under time pressure which restricts the 
possibility of long-term purposive behaviour. The implications of delegating tasks to 
supranational institutions are thus often not taken into considerations at the time when 
decisions are made. Secondly, and mainly following from this, institutions, once established, 
tend to take on a life of their own and are difficult to control by those who created them (e.g. 
Pierson, 1996). Thirdly, concerned with increasing their own powers, supranational 
institutions become agents of integration, because they are likely to benefit from the 
progression of this process. Finally, institutional structures (of which supranational 
institutions are part) have an impact on how actors perceive their interests and identities.  
 The  Commission as the most prominent agent of integration facilitates and pushes 
agreement on integrative outcomes in several manners. For example, it can act a promotional 
broker by upgrading common interests (e.g. through facilitating logrolling or package deals) 
(cf. Haas, 1961, pp. 369ff). It may also cultivate relations with interest groups and national 
civil servants to gain support for realising its objectives. It has been pointed out that that the 
Commission is centrally located within a web of policy networks and relationships, which 
often results in the Commission functioning as a bourse where problems and interests are 
traded and through which support for its policies is secured (cf. Mazey and Richardson, 
1997). The Commission may also exert itself through its (often superior) expertise and act 
effectively due to its substantial propensity for forging institutional cohesion (Nugent, 1995). 
  Over the years, the Council Presidency has developed into an alternative architect of 
compromise. Governments taking on the six-month role face a number of pressures, such as 
increased media attention as well as peer group evaluation, to abstain from pursuing their 
national interest and to assume the role of a neutral mediator (e.g. Wallace, 1985b). During 
their Presidency, national officials also tend to undergo a sometimes rapid learning process 
about the various national dimensions which induces a more ‘European thinking’ and often 
results in ‘European compromises’ (Wurzel, 1996, pp. 272, 288). A number of case studies 
confirm Presidencies’ inclination to take on the role of an honest and promotional broker (e.g. 
Elgström, 2003; Tallberg, 2004). 
The  European Parliament (EP) has fought, and in many respects won, a battle to 
become, from being an unelected institution with minor powers under the Treaty of Rome, an 
institution which since the Treaty of Amsterdam is on an equal footing with the Council in the 
larger part of normal secondary legislation (Maurer, 2004, p. 230). It has very clearly become 
another centre of close interest group attention (Bouwen, 2004) and plays a critical, even if not   13
wholly successful, role in the legitimisation of the European Union. Even at the IGC level its 
role has significantly increased. It has traditionally pushed for further integration, partly in order 
to expand its own powers (Westlake, 1994).  
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has been able to assert the primacy of Community 
law and transform the Treaty of Rome into something like a constitution, a process described as 
‘normative supranationalism’ (Weiler, 1981, 1991). The Court has raised the awareness of 
subnational actors concerning the opportunities offered to them by the Community legal 
system. It helped create these opportunities by giving pro-Community constituencies a direct 
stake in Community law through the doctrine of direct effect. The European Court of Justice 
also has a self-interested stake in the process: it seeks to promote its own prestige and power 
by raising the visibility, effectiveness and scope of EC law (e.g. Burley and Mattli, 1993). In 
addition, the (ECJ) has been singled out as an important agent of recognising and giving way 
to functional pressures. Moreover, the Court tends to upgrade common interest. While the 
Commission is doing so by acting as an institutionalised mediator, the ECJ is justifying its 
decisions in light of the common interests of members as enshrined in the general objectives 
of the original EEC Treaty. The modus operandi is the ‘teleological’ method of interpretation, 
by which the Court managed to rationalise many important decisions, such as those on direct 
effect (on the above see Burley and Mattli, 1993; Mattli and Slaughter, 1998).  
 
Countervailing forces  
 
As integration cannot solely be conceptualised as a dynamic process, countervailing, inertia or 
spillback forces need to be accounted for. One can only ascertain the relative strength of the 
dynamics of integration if one also accounts for inertia forces. In the absence of strong 
countervailing pressures even weak integrative forces may drive the integration process 
forward. In such a case the strength of the dynamics may easily be overestimated. When 
demonstrating that outcomes, which went beyond the lowest common denominator, came 
about even despite strong countervailing forces, the case for the causal relevance of the 
hypothesised dynamics is considerably strengthened. In addition, it is maintained that 
informed guesses about the integration process cannot be made without taking countervailing 
pressures on board. For reasons of simplicity and methodology
10 ‘inertia forces’ are grouped 
                                                 
10 Lijphart (1971, p. 678) has pointed out that limiting the number of variables is advisable in comparative 
research which looks at only a few cases, as otherwise the researcher would not have enough observations per 
variable and the outcome would be indeterminate.   14
together here and conceptualised as one single hypothesis. The following main countervailing 
forces – which partly overlap – can be hypothesised:  
 
Sovereignty-consciousness – which in its most extreme form can be described as nationalism 
– encapsulates actors’ lacking disposition to delegate sovereignty to the supranational level, or 
more specifically to yield competences to EU institutions. Sovereignty-consciousness tends to 
be linked to (national) traditions, identities and ideologies and may be cultivated through 
political culture and symbolisms (cf. Callovi, 1992; Meunier and Nicolaïdis, 1999). 
Sovereignty-consciousness has repeatedly impeded the development of the Community, as, 
for example, during de Gaulle’s and Thatcher’s terms of office. Other less prominent actors 
such as bureaucrats, especially when working in ministries or policy areas belonging to the 
last bastions of the nation-state, can be sovereignty-conscious agents. Sovereignty-
consciousness tends to rise with waning trust in the objects of delegation, i.e. EU institutions. 
 
Domestic constraints and diversities may significantly circumscribe governments’ autonomy to 
act (cf. e.g. Hoffmann, 1964, pp. 89, 93; Moravcsik, 1993, pp. 483-94). Governments may be 
constrained directly by agents, such as by lobby groups, opposition parties, the media/public 
pressure, or more indirectly by structural limitations, like a country’s economy, its 
demography, its legal tradition or its administrative structure. Governments’ restricted 
autonomy to act may prove disintegrative, especially when countries face very diverging 
domestic constraints. This may disrupt emerging integrative outcomes, as domestic 
constraints of governments may lead to national vetoes or prevent policies to move beyond 
the lowest common denominator. In the case of strong domestic constraints in different 
Member States, considerable overlap in the (domestic constraint-based) positions might be 
necessary in order to arrive at substantial common accords due to the restricted scope for 
changing positions on the part of governments. Bureaucratic politics also partly comes under 
this rubric, when constraints created at this level are not so much ideological in nature (cf. 
sovereignty consciousness), but when bureaucrats limit governmental autonomy of action in 
order to protect their personal interests or to channel the interests of their ‘constituencies’. 
 
Diversity  can either be viewed as a sub-issue, or the structural component of, domestic 
constraints or as a countervailing pressure on its own.
11 The economic, political, legal, 
                                                 
11 On the issue of diversity in the integration literature, see for example Wallace (1985a) and Héritier (1999, esp. 
pp. 4-8).   15
demographic, sociological, administrative or cultural diversity of Member States may counter 
common integrative endeavours. The sheer differences between Member States can prove to be a 
disintegrative force because common positions or policies may require some Member States to 
disembark substantially from existing structures, customs and policies which tend to have 
evolved over substantial periods of time and are linked to certain grown traditions. Hence, 
diversity may potentially entail considerable costs of adjustment for some actors. Diversity may 
also develop and have conflictual implications (among member governments) as a result of 
material benefits/costs and prospects of gaining or losing decision-making power through 
particular policy decisions. Diversity among Member States is reinforced through the gradual 
enlargement of the European Union. Domestic constraints and diversities help explaining 
variation in national choices for integration. 
 
Negative integrative climate: integrative climate is a broad variable that depicts general 
attitudes towards European integration and the EU. Since the early 1990s, national 
governments and the sub-national actors have increasingly stressed the importance of 
subsidiarity, public appeal for the Community has decreased and the Brussels bureaucracy is 
seen more and more as high-handed and aloof (cf. Papademetriou, 1996, p. 63). Although it 
can barely be traced, and may overall be of less relevance than the other two countervailing 
forces, an unfavourable integrative climate is believed to have a diffuse detrimental impact on 
decision-makers. It is also often related to economic recession (cf. Holland, 1980).  
 
 
Interconnections between explanatory factors 
 
As already alluded to earlier, the various pressures formulated above are interlinked in many 
ways and cannot always completely be separated from each other. Especially the dynamics 
are intertwined in multiple and complex ways. For example, the two structural dynamics 
(functional and exogenous) require agency – particularly but not exclusively supranational 
actors and interest groups – to make an impact. Conversely, pro-integrative preference 
formation and learning processes implying European solutions – of national, supranational or 
transnational agents spelled out in the role of organised interests and supranational institutions  
– call for some (endogenous-functional or exogenous) structural input and medium to 
develop. In addition, the two structural dynamics are interconnected, as exogenous pressures 
(such as international competition) can give rise to or help create functional-endogenous 
logics (e.g. those stemming from the single market). The more actor-centred dynamics are   16
also interwoven. For instance, supranational actors often cultivate relations with interest 
groups and thus foster integrative pressures. Hence, the presence of a certain dynamics may 
activate other integrative pressures, as a result of which the dynamics can be seen as mutually 
reinforcing. The linkages among countervailing forces are also significant as the above 
account of domestic constraints and diversity suggests.  
Particularly interesting is the relationship between the two key types of pressures. By 
hypothesising for countervailing forces in addition to dynamics it follows, almost logically, to 
view or hypothesise integration to be a dialectical  process. The strength, variation and 
interplay of pressures on both sides of the equation thus determine the outcome of a particular 
decision-making issue or process. More specific insights about the relationship between 
dynamics and countervailing pressures are expected from the subsequent empirical analysis.  
 
 
 
Methodology 
 
My epistemological position can be located somewhere between the positivist and post-
positivist extremes, acknowledging the importance of interpretative and contextual features in 
establishing causal inferences and middle-range generalisations. My dependent variable is the 
outcome of instances of decision-making/negotiations, and my key causal (independent) 
variables are the various pressures mentioned above. I start off from a multiple causality 
assumption, arguing that the same outcome can be caused by different combinations of 
factors. My analysis can be described as qualitative. In order to arrive at valid causal 
inferences, allowing for some degree of positive causality, a number of methods are 
employed, including comparative analysis, tracing of causal mechanisms and processes, as 
well as triangulation across multiple data sources (including documentation, participant 
observation, and about 70 interviews for the subsequent cases). The danger of case selection 
bias has been minimised by choosing cases according to a range of values concerning the 
dependent variable, without paying attention to the values of the key causal variables (the 
identification of which was subject to my inquiry). Outcomes range from very modest (1996-
97 IGC) to far-reaching/progressive (Convention / last IGC), with the IGC 2000 somewhere 
between these two poles. More can be learned about the causal relevance of explanatory 
factors when we examine cases with varying outcomes (cf. King et al., 1994) 
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NEGOTIATIONS ON THE REFORM OF THE COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY 
 
The Common Commercial Policy and Article 113/133
12 
 
The Common Commercial Policy (CCP) is one of the oldest and most integrated policy areas 
of the European integration project. It was named in Article 3 of the Treaty of Rome as one of 
the main policies of the European Economic Community. As Member States were linked in a 
customs union, it was essential for them to draw up common policies regarding their 
commercial relations with the rest of the world (Devuyst, 1992; Eeckhout, 1991). The Treaty 
of Rome was revolutionary in the sense that it granted the new supranational entity an 
external personality with the authority to set out, negotiate and enforce all aspects of trade 
relations with the rest of the world. This was to be achieved through a common trade policy 
based on the principles of a common external tariff, common trade agreements with the rest of 
the world and the uniform application of trade instruments across the Member States. 
Although the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice as well as the Constitutional Treaty 
made some amendments, the main principles of the CCP have largely remained the same. 
  Article 133 (ex 113), the centrepiece of the external trade policy, provides that the 
Council will give a mandate to the Commission to open negotiations with third countries, in 
which the Commission acts as the sole negotiator. This mandate may include directives the 
Commission must respect in fulfilling its task. The Commission is ‘assisted’ during 
negotiations by the Article 113 Committee which is not largely ‘consultative’, as the Treaty 
provisions suggest, but also watches over the Commission’s shoulder during negotiations 
(Meunier and Nicolaïdis, 1999). Once negotiated, the Commission will initiate an agreement 
with third countries on behalf of the Community if it regards the outcome of negotiations 
satisfactory, but the right to conclude the agreement rests with the Council acting in principle 
by qualified majority but in practice usually on a consensual basis (Westlake, 1995). The role 
of the European Parliament (pre Constitution) is very modest in this field. It is merely 
informed by the Commission and the Council of the conduct of external trade negotiations 
and may be voluntarily asked for its opinion before the formal ratification of an international 
agreement. 
 
                                                 
12 Article 113, the centrepiece of the Common Commercial Policy, after the renumbering of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, became Article 133. I will therefore refer to Article 113 during my analysis of the negotiations of 
the 1996-97 IGC and to Article 133 when I talk about the outcome of those negotiations (i.e. the Amsterdam 
Treaty provisions). I also refer to Article 133 in my analysis of the IGC 2000 and the Convention/IGC 2003-04.   18
 
The controversy over the scope of Article 113/133 
 
Many authors have pointed out that the Community’s Common Commercial Policy was rather 
poorly drafted, especially with regard to definition and scope (Bourgeois, 1995; Ehlermann, 
1984, pp. 767-68). They deplore the fact that the Treaty of Rome only included a non-
exhaustive list of examples of subjects belonging to the CCP but contained no clear definition 
of the boundaries of this policy. As a consequence of this lack of a precise definition, the 
external trade policy has been subject to recurrent disputes between the Commission, the 
Council, Member States and the Parliament.  
  In its case law, the European Court of Justice has been rather progressive, especially 
until the mid-1980s. It has generally interpreted the Community’s external trade powers 
widely.
13 However, the Court failed to settle the institutional controversies between the 
Commission and the Council in the 1980s, so that the Commission attempted to put an end to 
the permanent debate surrounding the scope of Article 113 during the Maastricht IGC. In its 
proposal, the Commission ambitiously, but unsuccessfully, aimed at an exclusive common 
policy in the field of external economic relations which, in addition to trade in goods, also 
sought to include trade measures related to services, intellectual property, investment, 
establishment and competition (cf. Devuyst, 1992). 
  The Commission’s quest to expand its powers under Article 113 was largely motivated 
by the changing multilateral trade agenda, which since the Uruguay Round (UR) included 
issues such as services, intellectual property rights and investment. The Commission and 
some Member States disagreed on who was competent on these ‘new’ trade issues, as a result 
of which the Commission requested a ruling by the Court of Justice. In its Opinion 1/94, the 
ECJ ruled that both the Community and its Member States are jointly competent to conclude 
international agreements of the type (and scope) of the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) and Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).
14 It did not rule on 
investment. The Court also left a number of other questions unsolved, for example by 
highlighting (again) the open nature of the Common Commercial Policy. Moreover, the Court 
demanded a duty of co-operation and unity of representation in matters where the Community 
and Member States are jointly competent, without however specifying how such unity of 
representation was to be achieved. In the aftermath of the Court’s ruling in 1994, negotiations 
                                                 
13 See, for example, the Court’s ruling in the ERTA case (22/70) and its Opinion 1/78. Cf. Gilsdorf (1996).   19
between the Commission and Member States on a code of conduct also came to nothing.
15 
Against this background, the Commission decided to submit a proposal for an extension of 
Article 113 within the framework of the Amsterdam IGC.  
 
 
The Intergovernmental Conference 1996/97 and the Treaty of Amsterdam  
 
After the Commission had put forward an ambitious proposal in July 1996 asking for an 
external economic policy competence going beyond services, intellectual property rights and 
investment (Commission 1996f)
16, the eventual outcome at Amsterdam was very modest. The 
result of the IGC negotiations was a new paragraph (5) in Article 133, according to which ‘the 
Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the 
European Parliament, may extend the application of paragraphs 1 to 4 to international 
negotiations and agreements on services and intellectual property insofar as they are not 
covered by these paragraphs’. The most significant difference compared to pre-Amsterdam 
provisions was that the new paragraph enabled the Council to extend the application of 
Article 133 to services and intellectual property rights by unanimity without having to go 
through another IGC (cf. e.g. Sutherland, 1997). There has been disagreement amongst legal 
observers as to whether competence could be extended permanently and generally, in relation 
to a named international body, or on a case-by-case basis (cf. Krenzler and da Fonseca-
Wollheim, 1998, p. 239; European Policy Centre, 1997b). Overall, observers commonly 
agreed that the progress made during the IGC 1996-97 negotiations was minimal, regardless 
of whether the benchmark used for assessment was the status-quo ante practice, the different 
options on the table, or the requirements of a changing world economy and multilateral trade 
agenda (cf. e.g. Patijn, 1997; Ludlow, 1997, p. 39; Brok, 1997, p. 45). 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
14 However, the Court found that the Community has exclusive competence in the areas of cross-frontier services 
and measures prohibiting the release for free circulation of counterfeit goods - goods imitating a genuine article 
that is usually sold under a trade mark. On this point see: Bourgeois (1994, pp. 770-71). 
15 In the meantime, multilateral negotiations on ‘unsolved business’ (of the Uruguay Round) in the area of 
services was conducted under unanimity, with the Commission as the exclusive negotiator. 
16 The ambition of the proposal is best viewed as bargaining strategy. What the Commission really aimed for was 
an extension of Article 113 to services, intellectual property and investment, which also became the toned down 
official Commission position from October 1996 (interview, 1999).   20
The Intergovernmental Conference 2000 and the Treaty of Nice 
 
At the Nice IGC external trade policy formed part of the broader issue of the extension of 
qualified majority voting, which was added to the IGC agenda at first hesitantly and later 
more decisively. The Common Commercial Policy first appeared on the list of items 
discussed under QMV in February 2000 and was formally included on the IGC agenda at the 
Feira European Council of 19-20 June 2000. During the negotiations Article 133 turned out to 
be one of six controversial QMV issues and stayed a contentious item until about halfway 
through the summit of Nice. 
The Nice provisions have brought some integrative progress in terms of the scope and 
depth of the Common Commercial Policy. Most importantly, the Community has gained 
‘explicit’
17 competence for the negotiation and conclusion of agreements relating to trade in 
services and commercial aspects of intellectual property.
18 Qualified majority voting applies 
to these areas. However, several important exceptions also have been introduced where 
unanimity is still applicable: (1) areas in which unanimity is required for the adoption of 
internal rules or where the Community has yet to exercise its competence; (2) where an 
agreement would go beyond the Community’s internal powers, notably by leading to 
harmonisation in areas for which the Treaty rules out such harmonisation. Agreements which 
relate to trade in cultural and audiovisual services, educational services, human health 
services have been explicitly excluded; (3) the negotiation and conclusion of international 
agreements in the field of transport.  
In addition, the Nice provisions contain some further important drawbacks: (1) foreign 
direct investment was not included within the scope of Article 133; (2) unanimity is still 
required for the negotiation and conclusion of horizontal agreements, if one of the above 
derogation areas forms part of the negotiations. Furthermore, ratification by the Member 
States is needed in such cases; (3) the European Parliament remains excluded from decision-
making in the CCP and has not even obtained a formal right of consultation; (4) Member 
States are still allowed to maintain and conclude agreements with third countries or 
                                                 
17 The Treaty of Nice had made the competence on services and intellectual property ‘explicit’. However, legal 
scholars seem to agree that competences in these areas were still shared between the Community and Member 
States. Cf., for example, Krenzler and Pitschas (2001: 302); Herrmann (2002: 13, 19). 
18 New competences are conferred on the Community, (only) insofar as these topics were not previously covered 
by Article 133 EC or an implied power. Hence, cross-frontier services and the protection against counterfeit 
goods at the Community’s external border – which were found by the Court in 1/94 to fall under the scope of the 
CCP – are not affected by the new provisions (and therefore also not by the QMV derogations below).   21
international organisations in the fields of trade in services and commercial aspects of 
intellectual property. 
Given these derogations and drawbacks, commentators both in the legal community 
and in the policy-making community have generally viewed the progress made as more 
substantial than the one achieved at Amsterdam, but still as rather modest, as regards the 
Community’s capacity to act on the international scene (Duff, 2001, p. 14; Brok, 2001, p. 88; 
Krenzler and Pitschas, 2001, p. 312). In addition, many authors have lamented the complexity 
of the Treaty text which does not meet the growing demands for greater simplicity and 
transparency (e.g. Pescatore, 2001, p. 265; Hermann, 2002: p. 16; Leal-Arcas, 2004, p. 13). 
 
 
 
The Convention, the IGC 2003-04 and the Constitutional Treaty 
 
The Laeken European Council decided to depart from the more standard methods of preparing 
EU Treaty reforms and thus opted against the establishment of a group of government 
representatives or a group of wise men and women. Instead, it was decided to convene a 
Convention on the Future of Europe (cf. Presidency conclusions, December 2001). The idea 
of a Convention was first suggested by the European Parliament and later supported, above 
all, by the EP, the Belgian Presidency and the Commission. The Common Commercial Policy 
was identified by members of the Convention early on as one of the issues that required 
further discussion. Within the Convention Working Group on External Action, the CCP was 
of secondary importance in comparison with the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The 
Draft Treaty that came out of the Convention was very close to the Constitution text.. The 
CCP only played a subordinate role at the IGC 2003-04 where the provisions of the Draft 
Constitutional Treaty were watered down only insubstantially.
19  
The Treaty provisions on the Common Commercial Policy have substantially 
progressed in terms of scope and depth. The following are the most important advances: (1) 
foreign direct investment is now included under the scope of the CCP in addition to services 
and intellectual property; (2) services and intellectual property (and also investment) now fall 
within the exclusive competence of the Community; (3) the European Parliament has obtained 
co-decision on legislative acts, i.e. for measures implementing the CCP. In addition, consent 
by the EP is required for most types of international agreements; (4) mainly following from 
                                                 
19 A rather narrow derogation on social, education and health services was (re)introduced during the IGC. Also 
investment belongs to those policies (alongside with services and intellectual property) for which unanimity 
applies externally where this is required for the adoption of internal rules.     22
the second point, horizontal agreements involving services, intellectual property and 
investment may now be decided by QMV
20; (5) exceptions for unanimity have been further 
narrowed. Unanimity in the external realm is still required on services, intellectual property 
and investment, where unanimity is required for the adoption of internal rules. However, the 
derogation regarding cultural and audiovisual services has become narrower and the burden of 
proof to invoke these exceptions lies with those Member States that want to apply them 
(interviews, June/July 2004; cf. Article III-314, paragraph 4); (6); following from the second 
point, national parliaments are no longer needed for the ratification of future WTO 
agreements (involving the new issues). The new Article III-314 provides a substantial degree 
of further integration. Interviewees have, unlike regarding the provisions of Amsterdam and 
Nice, consistently agreed on the progressiveness of this latest CCP Treaty revision (cf. also 
Antoniadis, 2004).  
 
After having looked at the outcomes of the last three Treaty revisions, the subsequent analysis 
will examine the strength and relevance of the six hypothesised pressures concerning the 
extension of Article 113. We analyse in turn (1) exogenous pressures; (2) functional-
endogenous pressures; (3) socialisation, deliberation and learning; (4) the role of organised 
interests; (5) the role of supranational institutions; and (6) countervailing forces. 
 
 
Exogenous pressures 
 
Overall exogenous pressures constituted the most important dynamic for reforming the CCP. 
The factors at play here were globalisation and, closely related, changes in the world 
economy, as well as subsequent developments in the multilateral trade regime and the 
international trade agenda. Globalisation has fostered changes in the world economy, such as 
the increasing importance of trade in services, in intellectual property rights and foreign direct 
investment, issues which have begun to feature much more prominently on the multilateral 
trade agenda since the Uruguay Round (UR). The Commission has traditionally argued that 
the scope of Article 113/133 needs to be interpreted in a dynamic way. As trade policy 
                                                 
20 When those areas that are specifically excepted (see next point) are included in horizontal agreements, 
unanimity still applies. Antoniadis (2004) has suggested that horizontal agreements are likely to be concluded by 
unanimity in the future because of the derogation on cultural diversity (see below) can be easily invoked. My 
interviews suggest, however, that as this derogation has been narrowed and the burden of prove been shifted 
towards those Member States seeking to apply it, qualified majority voting may not be unlikely for concluding 
future horizontal agreements.   23
changes and trade in goods loses in importance, the Community powers under the Common 
Commercial Policy become gradually eroded.  
  During the IGC 1996-97 negotiations exogenous pressures were already rather strong. 
Services in the early to mid-1990s – the period most relevant for decision-makers‘ perceptions 
concerning the Amsterdam negotiations – accounted for 20 per cent of all world trade, and for 
26  per cent of EU external trade (Krenzler, 1996). The growing importance of services in the 
world economy was apparent by the conclusion of a General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) during the Uruguay Round. While the UR achieved historic results in terms of 
market access liberalisation in important services areas, services liberalisation was by no 
means completed. The GATS created a framework of continuing negotiations on the 
liberalisation of the supply of services which meant that the question of external competence 
for the conclusion of international services agreements continued to be a very important issue 
also after the UR. Liberalisation of Uruguay Round commitments in some major sectors 
including audio-visual services, financial services, maritime transport and 
telecommunications were very limited or non existent (cf. Dyer et al., 1997, p. 217). These 
issues became subject to specialised sectoral negotiations as ‘outstanding business’ of the UR.  
  As trade in intellectual property rights (IPRs) substantially increased in previous 
decades, incentives to breaches IPRs also rose. It was estimated in the mid-1990s that the EU 
lost at least 10 per cent of the value of its exports to copyright piracy (Adamantopoulos, 
1997). As a result of these trends, IPRs were included in the UR negotiations. The TRIPS 
agreement attempts to regulate and standardise international property rights in order to 
prevent the above mentioned abuses and so create a fairer trade market. With the agreement 
on TRIPS and the establishment of the WTO, trade remedies (sanctions) can be made 
available to enforce the protection of intellectual property rights. Thus, IPRs became a 
frequent item in WTO dispute settlement.  
  Foreign direct investment (FDI) has become a significant area of growth in the global 
economy and one of particular importance to the EU. Figures from the early to mid-1990s 
indicated that 36 percent of world-wide FDI inflow originated from the EU and that the EU 
received about 19 percent of world inflow (United Nations 1995). As a result of the global 
increase in FDI, Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) were included for the first time 
in the UR. The Community has a vital interest in trade and investment, as restrictive national 
measures (e.g. rules on the share of goods to be produced at home) have a direct negative 
impact on trade. The agreement on TRIMS obligates members to scrap their trade-related 
investment standards, but it leaves important practices untouched. Trade and investment was   24
likely to reappear on the WTO negotiating agenda in the future, not least because it was 
agreed at Marrakesh in 1994 to review the issue within five years.  
As pointed out above shared competence applied to services and IPRs (while the Court 
had remained silent on investment). What were the perceived implications of mixed 
competence for the Community in international negotiations? Most importantly, unanimity 
applies to the conduct and conclusion of negotiations. In the case of horizontal agreements 
like a comprehensive multilateral trade round, which the EU was advocating at the time of the 
Amsterdam IGC (and also later on) discussion of any one mixed competence item would 
expand this legal basis to the whole agreement (Krenzler and da Fonseca-Wollheim, 1998, p. 
229). Mixed competence and unanimity have, among other factors, been associated with 
lowest common denominator agreements and the potential abuse of the veto option. It also 
increases the potential for third parties to play ‘divide-and-rule’ games, e.g. through 
influencing certain Member States by offering them bi-lateral concessions in order to prevent 
or hinder the formation of an EU position (cf. Brittan, 1996; Petite, 1997). 
The second major implication of mixed competence is that, legally speaking, the 
Commission is not the sole negotiator for the Community and Member States. In theory, the 
latter can intervene throughout negotiations, either individually or as represented by the 
Presidency. In practice the Commission and Member States have sought to avoid this. The 
problem of the representation of the Community and Member States in external trade 
negotiations was around since the beginning of the Uruguay Round. It was not solved by the 
Court in 1/94. Although the ECJ demanded that there was a duty of co-operation to ensure the 
Community’s unity of action and efficient external representation it did not state how this was 
to be achieved. After the conclusion of the UR negotiations, a code of conduct was reached on 
the post-Uruguay Round negotiations on services, according to which the Commission should 
continue to negotiate (under unanimity) on behalf of the Community and the Member States 
(see Council, 1994). Negotiations on a general code of conduct for participation in the WTO 
had, however, failed on several occasions. However, the Spanish Presidency proposal of 
December 1995 (according to which the Commission acts as the sole negotiator)
21 has been 
taken as a basis for negotiations. Some Member States have claimed that the Commission’s 
role as the sole negotiator is undisputed, thus rendering an extension of Article 113 
unnecessary (interview, 1999). The Commission, in contrast, has emphasised that the situation 
had become worse since the UR. Member States threatened to act independently in the WTO, 
                                                 
21 According to the final text which did not pass COREPER in December 1995, Member States can be present at 
meetings but only speak when a Member State considers that the Commission has presented the situation in a 
confusing manner or where the Commission renounces to express itself (Spanish Presidency, 1995).   25
if their positions are not fully covered by the Community. A decision by the French National 
Assembly indicates that this was not only considered, but actually aimed at (Krenzler and da 
Fonseca-Wollheim, 1998, p. 231). In the negotiations on maritime transport, Denmark and 
Greece expressed themselves independently, in addition to the Commission and the 
Presidency. The implications can vary. As one Commission official pointed out: ‘it is enough 
when Member States just highlight a certain aspect more than the Commission, 
without saying anything substantially different. Still, the character of the Community position 
will be influenced, and a delicate balance envisaged by the Commission in its position may be 
upset’ (interview, 1997). Outside the WTO framework, negotiations on intellectual property 
rights, for instance in WIPO, and on investment issues, as in the OECD, are conducted by 
Member States themselves. In such cases, Member States often negotiate against each other, 
which makes it easy for Japan and the United States to play one Member State off against 
another. As an official put it: ‘In the WTO such a dissonant choir of 15 voices would be a 
catastrophe’.
22 According to one Commission interviewee, ‘it is quite clear that as far as the 
WTO is concerned, legal confirmation of what is today only a de facto situation, subject to be 
questioned at any time, would significantly improve the standing of the Commission as a sole 
negotiator’ (interview, 1998). 
There has been another implication of mixed competence. It was anticipated that the 
Community would experience great difficulties in dispute settlement cases in the areas of 
GATS and TRIPS. For example, in TRIPS cases Member States cannot cross-retaliate by 
taking sanctions in the goods sector, as the Community has competence in that area. Often, 
however, third countries (especially Lesser Developed Countries) can be hurt most in the area 
of goods. Hence, it has been argued that it does not make sense for Member States to enter 
into dispute settlement cases in the new trade areas on their own. Their purposes would be 
better served if competence for the disputed areas was transferred to the Community (cf. 
Kuyper, 1995, p. 114).  
The Commission and a few other Member States perceived the situation as described 
above and argued that the difficulties associated with mixed competence would be solved if 
the issue areas in question would pass to an exclusive community competence. A number of 
Member States did not view the probable consequences of mixed competence as severely 
limiting the coherence, effectiveness and proactiveness of EU trade policy. They argued that 
the Community managed to negotiate successfully in the WTO in areas where powers are 
                                                 
22 Quoted from an internal Commission paper: Commission, DG I, ‘Anmerkungen zur Stellungnahme des 
BMWi zum dem Kommissionsvorschlag über die Anpassung des Artikels 113’, Brussels, 16.10.96.   26
shared, thus denying the rationale for a change of the status quo because of transformations in 
the world economy. They also qualified the impact of unanimity by suggesting that if the 
Commission stuck to its negotiating mandate it did not have to fear unanimity for the 
conclusion of an agreement. Following this logic, the problems for the Commission during 
trade negotiations would be outweighed by an uncomplicated conclusion of the agreement 
(interview, Brussels 1999). Moreover, some reluctant Member States argued that despite the 
generous competencies of the Commission on issues governed under the scope of the CCP, it 
did not (always) represent the interests of the Community convincingly and that often it gave 
in too easily to the US, thus requiring Member States to ‘keep the Commission on a short 
leash’.
23  
Overall, exogenous pressures and the problems frequently associated with it were 
regarded as the most compelling logic for reforming the CCP during the IGC 1996-97. This 
applies equally to the Community institutions (e.g. Commission, 1996c; EP, 1994), to opinion 
leaders and think tanks (e.g. Sutherland, 1997; European Policy Centre, 1997a), as well as to 
Member governments (e.g. Belgian government, 1995).  
 
After the Amsterdam IGC, exogenous pressures grew slightly further and continued to be the 
most important dynamics behind the extension of Article 133 during the Nice 
Intergovernmental Conference. Services, intellectual property rights and investment remained 
important features of the international and especially the EU trade agenda. With the ‘GATS 
2000’ negotiations that started in January 2000 and important unfinished business from the 
Uruguay Round, including maritime and air transport as well as the impact of electronic 
commerce on the sector, services stayed particularly prominent in the WTO framework. The 
EU also pushed for the inclusion of intellectual property rights and investment, and a host of 
other issues, to become part of a more comprehensive multilateral trade round. The inclusion 
of investment on this agenda, or the WTO agenda more generally, was particularly pressing, 
given the failure to reach an agreement on investment in the framework of the OECD in 1998. 
Intellectual property also remained an important topic in the WTO, not least because many of 
the Dispute Settlement cases were (and still are) related to this issue.
24 
                                                 
23 It was felt, for example, that the Commission lacked forcefulness, on the question of the Community joining 
the Japanese-American semi-conductor agreement. Although the Commission had exclusive competencies and 
the 15 behind it, it could not match the US in the negotiations in Lyon (interview, Brussels, 1998). 
 
24 Further pressure for an extension of Article 133 was manifested as additional issues (such as trade and 
competition, trade and environment, trade and labour) gradually entered the international trade agenda. Cf., for 
example, Meunier and Nicolaidis (2000: 342).    27
Hence the problems associated with unanimity and the somewhat unresolved issue of 
representation at international negotiations remained, and were by many participants 
perceived as even more pressing (interviews, 2003, 2004). Changes in the international trade 
agenda and the implications associated with shared competence in services, intellectual 
property and investment, was the rationale most frequently stated by actors in their plead to 
extend the scope of Article 133 or QMV during the Nice IGC. The importance of this 
reasoning has also been recognised, to some extent, in the academic discourse (cf. Meunier 
and Nicolaidis, 2000, pp. 341-343; to a lesser extent: van Dijck and Faber, 2000: esp. pp. 321-
322, 330-331). 
 
At the Convention and the last Intergovernmental Conference, exogenous pressures continued 
to be as strong as during the Nice Treaty revision. The mismatch between international 
economic/trade policy realities and the internal provisions under Article 133 was growing.  
The inclusion of services and intellectual property as well as issues such as ‘trade and 
environment’ on the comprehensive agenda of WTO negotiations under the Doha Round, 
which got underway in early 2002, further exacerbated this disparity.
25 However, with the 
entering into force of the Treaty of Nice in February 2003 part of this gap has been closed due 
to the Community’s somewhat increased competences on services and intellectual property. 
On the other hand, horizontal agreements, like the Doha Round, were still to be negotiated 
and concluded under unanimity if one of the many derogation areas was to be included which 
was looming (large) at the time of the Convention and the IGC 2003/04. That exogenous 
pressure played an important role at the last Treaty revision is further substantiated by the 
frequent and prominent usage of this rationale in the argumentations in favour of a (further) 
extension of Article 133, especially by the Commission.
26 
 
 
Functional pressures 
 
During the IGC 1996-97 functional pressures – both those stemming from the internal market 
and those stemming from the internal policy goal of enlargement – were rather insubstantial. 
                                                 
25 Issues such as ‘investment’ and ‘trade and competition’ also, for a long time, seemed to form part of this 
agenda and were strongly advocated by the EU. Only by July 2004, it became certain/clear that these issues 
would not be negotiated within the Doha Round. Hence, during the Convention and the IGC 2003/04 the 
mismatch rationale also applied to these two issues, also because these issues are likely to reappear in the WTO 
(or another) trade context. On the EU pushing these issues, see for example: Commission (2003).  
26 See, for example, Lamy (2002, 2003). This general trend has been confirmed by interviews (2004).    28
As for the internal market as a source of pressure, the doctrine of implied powers, as 
interpreted by the Court of Justice, did provide such pressure in the past.
27 According to this 
doctrine, also referred to as ‘parallelism’, common rules laid down internally could be 
(adversely) affected, if Member States act individually to undertake international obligations.  
However, at the Amsterdam IGC the internal, functional pressure stemming from the doctrine 
of implied powers was rather negligible. In its Opinion 1/94, the ECJ had rather 
comprehensively rejected its logic. The Court held that an exclusive competence in the area of 
services was not necessary for achieving the objective of realising the freedom to provide 
services by nationals of the Member States within the common market (see para. 86). Nor did 
the internal harmonisation of IPRs have to be accompanied by agreements with third countries 
to be effective. Moreover, the Court held that there was little danger of internal rules being 
affected, if Member States remained free to negotiate agreements with third countries, as 
internal harmonisation in the fields of services and IPRs was only (very) partial at the time 
(cf. O’Keeffe, 1999; Arnull, 1996, p. 356; Monti, 1996). Given this (rather persuasive) 
reasoning by the Court only a few years prior to the IGC, neither the Commission, nor any 
other negotiating party, attempted to argue along the lines of the internal powers doctrine. In 
addition, potential functional logics related to the internal market and trade deflection did not 
create any substantial pressures.
28 
A moderate functional logic was at work through pressures stemming from the 
decision on future enlargement, taken at various European Councils since Edinburgh in 1992. 
Although an exogenous event, enlargement after those internal commitments largely became 
an endogenous source of pressure for reform of EU decision-making procedures. It was the 
internal EU agenda and the way this was marketed within and outside the Union rather than 
demands from applicant countries which put the Union under pressure to reform its 
institutions and decision rules. Once enlargement became an internal goal problems/tensions 
were created (anticipated) in terms of decision-making and co-ordination among the Member 
States under unanimity (exerting pressure for an extension of QMV in trade matters). 
Unanimity was already regarded as problematic with 15 delegations by some players. This 
logic of anticipated problems was argued in various Commission papers on the modernisation 
of Article 113 (cf. Commission 1996a; Krenzler, 1996, p. 6). However, eventually, this 
functional argument never gained much strength. It was pointed out: ‘in the end it was the 
                                                 
27 Cf. ERTA case (case 22/70), ECR 263, [1971]; and Opinion 1/76, ECR 741, [1977]. 
28 Given space limitations this point cannot be elaborated here. For a more detailed account see Niemann (2005 
forthcoming).   29
lack of urgency that made the Conference decide on only partial reform. No enlargement is 
foreseen before 2003-2005’ (Patijn, 1997, p. 38). This indeed seems to have been the 
prevailing mood among decision-makers at the Amsterdam IGC, also regarding the CCP issue 
(interview, 1997). 
  One important argument used by the more reluctant Member States was that there may 
be a transfer of internal competencies from the Member States to the Community in some 
fields coming under exclusive Community competence externally. Hence, they were afraid 
that external liberalisation could foster a process of internal liberalisation (also cf. Hanson, 
1998), and that the Commission could use the backdoor of Article 113 to regulate in areas 
which fall under Member States’ competence. As one official maintained, ‘it was conceivable 
that the Commission could have gained the power to sell Member States restrictions [laid 
down in the GATS schedule of concessions] in multilateral trade negotiations in exchange for 
market access for some third countries. With an extension of Article 113 to services, such a 
decision could theoretically be taken by QMV’ (interview, 1999). The Commission 
acknowledged that the external realm can influence the internal, but that such overlaps and the 
potential repercussion were exaggerated by some Member States. My interviewing with 
(Commission) officials and review of (formerly confidential) internal documents suggest that 
the Commission was genuine about its concern of enhancing its external competencies only, 
and that the ‘risks’ of prejudging internal competencies were viewed as insubstantial. 
Nevertheless, the perception/anticipation of potential adverse implications of functional 
interdependencies between the internal and external dimensions on the part of some Member 
States had a slightly detrimental bearing on extension of the CCP. 
 
As for the IGC 2000, overall functional pressure had increased since the Amsterdam IGC. 
Most importantly in that respect, the pressure of enlargement had grown substantially. While 
there was still considerable lack of urgency in terms of forthcoming enlargement in the minds 
of negotiators during the 1996-97 IGC, enlargement had become more concrete with the 
launch and confirmation of the enlargement process at the Luxemburg European Council of 
1997 and the Helsinki European Council of 1999 respectively, and with the aim to welcome 
new Member States from the end of 2002 onward. The pressure on the CCP in terms of 
services, intellectual property and investment, as on other policies partially or wholly 
governed by unanimity, is obvious: with 25 Member States and the corresponding 
diversification of interests and increased heterogeneity of political cultures, decision-making 
is (significantly) more prone to paralysis. During the Nice IGC there was indeed an increased   30
(but not extraordinarily strong) sense of urgency as regards looming enlargement 
(Commission 1999; French Presidency, 2000; interviews, 2003, 2004). 
  Functional pressures stemming from the internal market had also grown since the 
1996-97 IGC. The doctrine of implied powers to some extent increased the rationale for an 
exclusive Community competence for external trade policy. Internal legislation in services 
and IPRs had continued to increase. The internal market in telecommunications, for example, 
was almost complete at the time of the IGC negotiation. However, in most other areas internal 
legislation was either still incomplete or lacking effective transposition and implementation 
(cf. Commission, 2000c). Hence, from an implied powers perspective, an exclusive external 
trade competence across all services and intellectual property and investment did not follow. 
However, implied powers in a broader sense did, to some extent, inform policy-makers and 
legal drafters during the IGC. The Commission services of DG Trade have referred to the 
doctrine of parallelism as ‘the guiding principle of the new Article 133’, the purpose of which 
is ‘to align the decision-making mechanism for trade negotiations on internal decision-making 
rules’ (Commission, 2000d). Therefore, QMV was codified for services and intellectual 
property except where internal Community rules require unanimity or where no 
harmonisation has taken place at Community level.
29  
  The anticipation of functional pressure, which acted as a moderate obstacle to CCP 
reform during the Amsterdam IGC (due to fears that the Commission could use the backdoor 
of Article 133 to ‘regulate’ areas Member State internal competence), still place role albeit a 
diminished one. Their reservations were further reduced due to the progression of the internal 
market, which provided less scope for the prejudgement of internal competences.  
 
Functional pressures further increased after the IGC 2000 and also correspondingly influence 
the Convention and last IGC. For example, the pressure of enlargement became even stronger 
and also more urgent as the accession of new Member States was supposed to take place from 
the end of 2002. Moreover, the Seville European Council of June 2002 expected the 
Accession Treaty to be signed in spring 2003 and anticipated the participation of new 
Member States in the 2004 EP elections. Therefore, decision-making in the Council with 25 
Member States was now an imminent reality, which put substantial pressure on those trade 
policy issues subject to unanimity. Enlargement became a frequent rationales used to 
substantiate the need for further CCP reform (e.g. Lamy, 2002). 
                                                 
29 The explicit derogation areas (education, human health, culture and transport) also very largely followed this 
rationale.    31
  Moderate additional functional pressures were created by the Laeken European 
Council Declaration on the Future of Europe. Herein, the Heads of State and Government 
restated and reinforced a number of aims. In order to achieve these goals, a deepening of 
certain policies, such as the CCP, was necessary (or at least the most logical solution), hence 
creating pressures for further communitarisation. The first objective stated in the Laeken 
Declaration was the strengthening of the Union’s role in the world. In order to achieve this 
collective goal, improvements in the decision rules of the CCP was ‘at least a logical 
corollary, if not a necessity’ (interview, 2004). The second set of aims of Laeken was greater 
simplification and efficiency. Given the complexity of the Nice provisions on Article 133, the 
CCP was an obvious candidate for improvements along these lines. Streamlining and 
rationalisation of external trade policy provisions can, of course, go both ways: re-
nationalisation or supranationalisation. However, given the various other pressures, the bias 
was clearly in favour of the Community method. Finally, Heads of State and Government 
called for greater democracy and transparency. In terms of the CCP this aim could, again, 
have repercussions in two different directions: either greater involvement of national 
parliaments or a more substantial role for the EP. And again the bias was in the latter 
direction, given the overall tendency towards more Commission competence and more QMV 
which is well complimented by stronger EP involvement under the tried and tested 
Community method. The functional tensions created by these aims should not be exaggerated, 
as they had been formulated at various European Councils before without having much 
impact. The difference this time was two-fold. These objectives were arguably emphasised 
more strongly than in previous Presidency conclusions
30 and the members of the Convention 
took them more seriously than officials preparing previous IGCs (interview, 2004). 
  Pressure from the international market, which played a moderate level during the IGC 
2000, was diminished. At Nice, the doctrine of implied powers had provided a rationale for 
establishing QMV for trade in services except for those areas where internal Community rules 
require unanimity or where no harmonisation has taken place at Community level (or where 
derogation areas formed part of horizontal agreements). One remaining anomaly was 
transport services
31. As a result, it was argued to drop the explicit derogation on transport 
                                                 
30 Cf. Presidency Conclusions of the following European Councils: Cannes (point IV), Madrid (pp. 1, 3), 
Helsinki (point I), Feira (point I) and Laeken. 
31 Transport is governed by QMV and there is considerable internal harmonisation. Another, less clear cut, 
anomaly is the audiovisual sector. Although there is a prohibition for harmonisation in this sector and though it is 
governed by unanimity, some harmonisation has taken place through the Television without Frontiers Directive 
(89/552/EEC). Moreover, in the Constitution, culture has been transferred to QMV internally, suggesting a 
departure from the doctrine of parallelism (cf. Antoniadis, 2004).   32
during the Convention. This reasoning, together with other pressures for further 
communitarisation, was initially followed in early Convention drafts which excluded the Nice 
exception on transport, but could not be maintained later on. Finally, the anticipation of 
further functional spillover played no substantial detrimental role this time, since the Nice 
provisions – prohibiting the conclusion of an external agreement if it includes provisions 
which would go beyond the Community’s internal powers – provided a sound safeguard for 
the concerns that some Member States had had during the Nice and Amsterdam IGCs. 
 
 
Socialisation, deliberation and learning processes 
 
My analysis of this factor has focuses on governmental elites (mainly on the official level) 
involved in Treaty revision preparations and negotiations (in a broad sense). As for the IGC 
1996-97, an investigation into (the lack of) socialisation, deliberation and learning processes 
further contributes to the explanation of the minimalist outcome at Amsterdam. My analysis 
has identified five reasons which help explain why socialisation and learning processes did 
not unfold. The first factor detrimental is the nature of the subject area combined with the 
background of negotiators. The negotiations on the extension of Article 113/133 were rather 
technical in nature, but there was little opportunity for specialists to come in for individual 
topics during the actual debates. While negotiators were at ease with institutional and CFSP 
questions, they usually found the issue of Article 113 ‘complex’ or ‘tricky’, and ‘requiring some 
pertinent legal and trade-political background’ which most of them did not have.
32 As a result, 
there was not much real debate going on. The IGC representatives usually presented the 
positions which they were instructed to present and then reported back home about the reactions 
of others. In terms of communicative action there was little scope for argumentative processes 
in which actors could persuade each other because truth- or validity-seeking is very difficult 
when actors lack the requisite expertise to evaluate each other’s validity claims. Thus, progress 
was more dependent on bargaining or compromising Member States’ strategic positions. 
Secondly, too little time was devoted to the CCP reform, which was not, in any case, 
regarded as a high priority issue, certainly in comparison with institutional questions, or dossiers 
such as JHA or CFSP. As one official has noted, ‘when we discussed external policy for an 
hour, we spent 55 minutes on CFSP and five minutes on Article 113’ (interview, 1999). There 
                                                 
32 Substantial expertise on trade was attested only to the Swedish (Gunner Lund), Finnish (Antti Satuli) and 
Belgian (de Schoutheete) representatives (interviews, Brussels, 1997, 1999).   33
was neither enough time to get to know in depth each other’s problems on the issue, nor for 
engaging in an extensive argumentative debate about the pros and cons and thus obstructed 
deliberative and (more deeply-rooted) learning processes. 
The third explanation is related to the negotiating group. The IGC Representatives 
Group took up its work in January 1996 and worked together only for one year and a half, 
which does not compare with the life span of other Council committees and working groups. 
Although nine out of the fifteen Member States’ representatives to the IGC had already 
participated in the Reflection Group, there was some disruption in terms of socialisation, as 
‘new members had to be “incorporated” into the group’ (interview, 1997). Although, there is 
some evidence for the development of a certain esprit de corps in the IGC Representatives 
Group (interviews, 1997, 1999), on balance it does not seem comparable to that in other (more 
permanent) Council forums. 
  Fourthly, ‘underlying the debate about thin dividing lines between Community and 
national competencies [on the CCP issue] was a basic distrust by some Member States of the 
role of the Commission in representing the Community in international negotiations and 
keeping the Member States abreast of what is going on’ (Patijn, 1997, p. 39, also Ludlow, 
1997, p. 52). The reason for this basic distrust of the Commission can be found in a number of 
events in the past when the Commission negotiated without the necessary transparency vis-à-
vis Member States, as happened, for example, in the negotiations leading to the ‘Blair House 
Agreement’
33. Much of the distrust vis-à-vis the Commission was focused on Sir Leon 
Brittan, with some governments holding him personally accountable for ‘being left in the dark 
about strategic decisions’ (Financial Times, 9/3/99). IGC representatives, although generally 
acknowledging the development of a certain club atmosphere in the negotiating group, stated 
that reports from their trade policy colleagues from capitals rubbed off on their own attitude 
vis-à-vis the Commission on this issue and also restricted IGC representatives’ room for 
manoeuvre. It is also said to have harmed open deliberation on this issue (interview, 1999). 
This suggests that a lack of trust concerning one of the parties may off-set socialisation 
processes and may develop into a countervailing pressure. 
Finally, there is the wider issue of bureaucratic politics. A serious problem throughout 
the negotiations was the adverse influences of ministries in Member States, including some 
lead departments on trade issues, coming out against an extension of the CCP. There were two 
main reasons for this: firstly, distrust of the Commission, as described above; and secondly, 
                                                 
33 In November 1992 the Commission made a pre-agreement on agriculture with the US. The Commission was 
accused by France of having been too accommodating at Blair House, especially on the issue of oil seeds. A year 
later the deal was re-opened due to French pressure.   34
the phenomenon that civil servants tend to try to hold on to their powers or have a substantial 
claim on expertise on the subject area (cf. e.g. Taylor, 1983). The Full Members of the Article 
113 Committee of Germany, the Netherlands and Portugal are said to have held status quo 
views for the above reasons and to have influenced their national positions accordingly. 
Adverse bureaucratic politics have acted as strong countervailing pressures to socialisation 
processes. They made a genuine debate on the benefits of reform difficult due to tight 
instructions given to some IGC Representatives. They are also partly responsible for the 
introduction of the ‘shopping list’ approach by the Dutch Presidency which enormously 
complicated the negotiations and invited further bureaucratic politics (see below). Under such 
circumstances, feelings of responsibility towards achieving progress in the negotiations that 
appeared to become somewhat ingrained in the IGC Representatives Group had no chance to 
unfold and drive the negotiations towards a more integrationist outcome.  
    
At the IGC 2000 socialisation processes could not unfold in the area of external trade policy, 
largely for the same reasons as a few years prior: (1) The nature of the subject area, along 
with the background of negotiators, was detrimental for making progress through 
argumentative debate. Neither the IGC Representatives, nor Foreign Ministers, nor Heads of 
State and Government, who dealt with the CCP issue at Nice, had the requisite knowledge and 
expertise to fully engage in a sensible discussion on this fairly complex subject. (2) Even 
though the issue of QMV was perhaps the most discussed topic in the Representatives Group, 
and despite the fact that the CCP was one of six rather prominent issues on the QMV agenda, 
there was simply not enough time available in order to engage in an extensive reasoned debate 
on the perceived opportunities and risks of extending QMV in external trade policy 
(interview, 2004). Moreover, the agenda at the Nice summit was very full with many 
unresolved issues (Gray and Stubb, 2001, p.13; cf. Economist, 16/12/00, p. 26). (3) The fact 
that the Representatives Group, which constituted the main negotiating arena of the Nice IGC, 
only met about 30 times and had a life span of less than a year did not allow for the 
development of very intense socialisation processes, certainly not comparable with 
committees or working groups in the Council framework.  
(4) Tight, inflexible and sometimes competing or contradictory instructions resulting 
from the demands of various national ministries hampered genuine exchange on the pros and 
cons of QMV in trade policy. As one official put it, ‘any emerging consensus achieved on the 
merits of the problem of unanimity in services was to be destroyed by yet another ‘input’ of 
some national ministry’ (interview, 2004). Hence, bureaucratic politics, aggravated by some   35
prevailing distrust of the Commission in several national ministries, impaired processes of 
socialisation and learning. (5) Institutional topics and the issue of the balance of power 
between small and big Member States, although largely left to the Nice summit, rubbed off on 
the discussions in the Representatives Group and damaged the atmosphere among 
delegations. Observers stated that they had never witnessed ‘such basic distrust’ among 
Ministers and Heads of State and Government as during the last part of the Nice IGC (e.g. 
Duff, 2001: 19). Against this background socialisation processes and reasoned debates had 
little chance to unfold.  
 
One of the more substantial changes from the previous two Treaty revisions was the greater 
favourable impact of socialisation, deliberation and learning processes in the Convention 
which also influence the Constitutional Treaty outcome. Such developments and processes 
were facilitated by several favourable conditions during the Convention: (1) the Convention 
started off with an initial listening and reflection phase during which expectations and visions 
could be freely stated. It generated a deeper understanding of other ideas and perceptions and 
softened pre-conceived opinions. (2) The Convention negotiating infrastructure – with more 
than 50 sessions that both the Plenary and the Praesidium held over a period of 18 months – 
also induced the development of an ‘esprit de corps’ and a strong sense of responsibility for a 
successful outcome in both forums of the Convention (Göler, 2003, p. 9). (3) Members of the 
Convention were in a position to act freely and were largely unbound by governmental briefs 
(Maurer, 2003, p. 134; but also cf. Magnette and Nicolaïdis, 2004, p. 393). Close related, one 
important source of countervailing pressures was largely shut out: bureaucratic resistances 
were in a much less favourable position to counter the deliberation process in the Convention 
because governments’ representatives did generally not have to go through the process of 
inter-ministerial coordination for the formation of national positions (Maurer, 2003: 136). (4) 
The atmosphere, spirit and negotiating structure in the Convention made it very difficult for 
members of the Convention to reject something without explanation, or without entering into 
a reasoned discussion were his or her arguments would become subject to scrutiny.  
Following from the previous points, the strength of the argument considerably 
mattered, while the hierarchy, status, affiliation, i.e. power of the negotiator was less relevant. 
As the might of the better argument increased in importance, the many convincing, especially 
exogenous rationales for modernising Article 133, which did not succeed to unfold during 
previous IGCs, now managed to make an impact. As one official put it, ‘we had had good 
arguments for the extension of Article 133 all along. However, for the first time, we had the   36
feeling that people were really considering these points and their implications’ (interview, 
2004).
34 
Moreover, in a deliberative process, negotiators tend to concur (more) fully in the 
common results achieved. A (reasoned) consensus rather than compromise is reached. My 
interviewing suggests that the CCP Convention outcome was, on the whole, perceived as 
such. This also, albeit to a lesser extent, applies to the Draft Constitutional Treaty which 
increased the weight and impact of the Convention text and made it difficult for negotiators at 
the IGC to (considerably) depart from this consensus.
35 Indeed, the concurrence in, and the 
satisfaction with, the Convention consensus, including the one on external trade policy, made 
an impact on the IGC in three interrelated ways: firstly, Member States were very much part 
of this consensus. The IGC 2003-04 was negotiated on the level of Ministers and Heads of 
State and Government only. And these two levels had, either directly or indirectly 
(represented), participated in the Convention process. Secondly, there was a general feeling 
that the Convention had done a good job and the dominant policy discourse suggested that the 
Convention text should be kept as much as possible (see e.g. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
16/6 and 18/6 2003; The Guardian, 14/3/03). Thirdly, and closely related, due to the 
substantial bonding strength of the CCP provisions and the Draft Constitutional Treaty more 
generally, the Convention text on most (non-institutional) issues, including external trade 
policy, became the basis for further negotiations at the IGC. In a way, it turned into the 
default setting, which is difficult to change at an IGC. As a result, the IGC 2003-04 hardly 
reopened debate on the CCP. 
What has been presented above as socialisation, deliberation and learning is difficult to 
further substantiate within given space limitations. Suffice to state that unstructured 
interviews (in which interviewees were not prodded) structured interviews (in which different 
characterisations of the Convention process were presented to interviewees), scrutiny of 
argumentations in different contexts to assess the truthfulness of speech acts,  analyses 
concerning the acceptance of ‘bad’ arguments by supposedly powerful actors compared with 
the impact of ‘good’ arguments and investigation regarding the degree of hierarchy used to 
                                                 
34 ‘Hard’ evidence concerning this type of learning is sparse. One strand of evidence points to the altered 
attitudes of some French nationals in the Convention regarding the value of having an exclusive Community 
competence on external trade. Some individuals, for example, began to increasingly argue the rationales which 
they had earlier contested, which is one indicator for more reflexive learning processes (interviews, June 2004).  
35 Interestingly in this respect, on the issue of institutions quite a number of important decisions were taken in the 
Praesidium, while many papers of the Convention Secretariat were not distributed and while there was less 
debate in the Plenary. At the end, representatives of some of the smaller Member States who had also not been 
represented in the Praesidium did not really concur in the decision, also because they did not entirely feel part of   37
make an argument have so far broadly underlined the considerable relevance of deliberative 
processes concerning the Convention negotiations on external trade (for a fuller account: 
Niemann, 2005 forthcoming).
36 
 
 
The role of organised interests 
 
Although most interest groups which took up the CCP issue during the IGC 1996-97 came out 
in favour of extending the scope of Article 113 (European Roundtable of Industrialists, 1997; 
UNICE, 1996; Eurochambres, 1996) on the whole there was little effective pressure exerted 
by organised interest. Incentive-based pro-integrative learning processes and adaptation on the 
part of interest groups have been limited. Despite the fact that external trade policy is one of 
the most integrated of EU policies, services, IPRs and investment have not been fully 
integrated, be it internally or externally. As one official pointed out, ‘it should not be 
forgotten that services, etc. are relatively new commercial issues. Many companies have not 
fully realised the enormous potential benefits from external trade liberalisation in those areas 
and the necessity for Europe to speak with one voice’ (interview, 1997). That there was a lack 
of awareness on the part of organised interests has also been suggested by Krenzler (1996, pp. 
5-6).  
There is another related explanation for the lack of attention and involvement on the 
part of interest groups in the new trade issues. As Ipsen (1994, p. 722) has pointed out, the 
lack of transparency and complexity of the GATT system goes some way to explain why 
producers, consumers, exporters and importers did not know the GATT rules, even those 
which favoured them, and also explains why there was no effective pressure group formation. 
This is all the more true in terms of the new multilateral trade regime, set up after the Uruguay 
Round with the adoption of the GATS and the TRIPS, which are both subject to complex 
rules, as well as the establishment of the WTO, which has brought services and IPRs under 
the complicated rules and procedures governing the settlement of disputes. Finally, groups 
such as the European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT) do not invest as much energy in 
issues which are rather sectoral and fragmented. As one observer pointed out, ‘although trade 
                                                                                                                                                         
the decision. As a result, these smaller Member States were also the first to demand a reopening of the 
institutional package during the IGC. 
36 For accounts of potential indicators capturing such processes, see for example Checkel (2001), Risse (2000), 
Niemann (2004).   38
in services and the commercial aspects of intellectual property rights are by no means peanuts, 
this does not compare in importance and scale, to the 1992 project’ (interview, 1999). 
  It is also worth pointing out that European umbrella organisations came out more in 
favour of extending the Community’s competence than most of their constituent members 
(Brussels, 1999). Moreover, some interest groups on the national level, such as the Bund 
Deutscher Industrie and the Deutscher Industrie- und Handelstag were divided in terms of 
their support for a modernisation of Article 113. While the European departments were 
clearly in favour, as they saw the benefits of speaking with a single voice, the departments for 
general external trade questions were more cautious (interview, 1997). As pointed out earlier, 
greater ‘proximity’ and involvement with the Brussels arena seems to induce pro-European 
learning processes. 
 
At the Intergovernmental Conference 2000, the impact of organised interests remained 
modest, perhaps even slightly below the level of the Amsterdam IGC. Although there was 
support for the extension of external trade policy among some segments of organised business 
interests (American Chamber of Commerce, 2000; UNICE, 2000), some important players 
remained rather uninvolved. The ERT, though generally in favour of extending Community 
competencies in the Common Commercial Policy, invested little political energy in the issue 
(Corporate Europe Observer, 2000). This lack of involvement has been explained by the fact 
that the CCP was fairly hidden within the broader QMV agenda. Moreover, there is still a 
certain lack of knowledge and awareness surrounding the CCP competence issue on the part 
of organised interest. One official has pointed out that ‘industry is not bothered so much, if 
the Commission negotiates under shared competence or exclusive competence, as long as the 
deals are struck. So far things have worked fairly well under shared competence. Perhaps 
some major failure is needed to wake up industry’ (interview, 2000). 
 
The integrative role played by interest groups augmented during the Convention, but did not 
exceed a (moderate to) medium level of pressure, although the involvement of organised 
interests and civil society as a whole has never been greater during any Treaty revision 
exercise. This was achieved through several means: a forum, which allowed non-
governmental organisations and interests to provide written contributions to the Convention; 
the establishment of eight contact groups to allow for an exchange of views with specific 
sectors of society; finally, public hearings, which gave civil society and organised interests a 
chance to address the Convention Plenary directly. Moreover, the European Social Partners   39
had one observer each in the Convention. Some members of the Convention also seem to 
have been rather positive concerning the chances of organised interests and civil society to 
influence the discussions in the Convention (cf. Maurer, 2003, p. 133). Eventually, UNICE 
(2002), the ERT (2002) and few national associations, such as the Bundesverband der 
Deutschen Industrie and the Bundesverband der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände (cf. BDI and 
BDA, 2001), submitted written contributions to the Convention in which they expressed their 
support for a further extension of Article 133. Overall, there seems to have been a slight 
increase in their activity from previous Treaty revisions. However, the level of organised 
industry’s activism was not enormous and their role was not viewed as decisive on external 
trade policy by anyone involved in the Convention or subsequent IGC. Their contributions 
had the most impact during the first months of the Convention when members were still in the 
process of making up their minds. However, papers and statements of organised interests 
‘were merely few out of many different inputs’ (interview, 2002). Some Commission officials 
have interpreted this overall trend as the results of certain learning processes on the part of 
industry concerning the benefits of greater integration of non-goods trade issues into the CCP, 
with yet further scope for increasing their awareness (interview, 2004).  
Counter to the positions taken by business interest groups, the post-Nice process saw, 
for the first time, a noticeable input from anti-globalisation movements and NGOs, opposing 
the extension of Community competence in external trade policy. They spoke out against 
further Community competencies because of the lack of democratic legitimacy in this area 
and the danger of creating a “bosses’ Europe”. However, they generally supported an 
increased role of the European Parliament (cf. Libertarians Against Nice, 2002; Article 133 
Information Group, 2002). The intensity and impact of their campaign should not be 
exaggerated (interview, 2004). By generally supporting the Draft Constitutional Treaty, both 
business groups (e.g. Eurochambres, 2003) and civil society (e.g. Act4Europe, 2003) 
contributed to reinforcing the bonding strength of the Convention text and thus also to a far 
reaching overall outcome, including external trade policy results. 
 
 
The role of supranational institutions 
 
During the 1996-97 IGC the role of supranational institutions provided little integrative 
impetus. The Commission, to begin with, did not manage to assert itself on the Article 
113/133 question during the IGC. This was due to several factors. Firstly, once a number of   40
Member States had become generally suspicious of the Commission, the latter’s possibility of 
influencing the important debate on the cope of the CCP had greatly diminished. By having 
overplayed its hand prior to the IGC, the Commission faced an uphill struggle during the 
Conference. Secondly, one of the general strengths of the Commission – its ability to forge 
internal cohesion (cf. Nugent, 1995) – could not be played out. DG I, the Commission IGC 
Task Force, Commissioner Brittan and his cabinet, and the Commission’s legal service failed 
to unite their energies in pursuit of achieving an extension of external trade competences. 
Apart from DG I, the other Commission fractions did not whole-heartedly push the issue in 
the IGC process (interviews, 1997, 1999; also cf. Niemann, 1995 forthcoming). Thirdly, the 
Commission held on to its demands for too long, and thus did not manage to avoid the 
‘shopping list’ approach of the Dutch Presidency. Several interviewees have argued that the 
Commission could have avoided this by tabling its own compromise proposal (also cf. 
Commission, 1997). Fourthly, the Commission negotiator, Marcelino Oreja, had only 
minimal interest in, and little understanding of, the issue and his performance on the Article 
113 dossier was judged as rather poor (interview, 1999). The Commission’s quest was not 
made easier by the fact that there was no support on the question by one of the big Member 
States, while the backing by the EP and the Brussels interest group community was limited.  
  The role played by the European Court of Justice in the run-up to the IGC was 
detrimental to the course of extending Article 113 at the Intergovernmental Conference 1996-
97. In its ruling 1/94 the Court showed that it had not endorsed the position of bringing 
services and IPRs within the scope of the Common Commercial Policy. It could be argued 
that due to the 1/94 ruling the Commission’s wish for an extension of Article 113 lacked 
critical legal endorsement by the very institution that had supported a dynamic-integrationist 
interpretation of Article 113 and EC law in general (cf. Pescatore, 1979; Emiliou, 1996). If 
even a generally activist ECJ did not want to extend the Community’s competencies to 
include all modes of services and IPRs, why would the Member States take this decision?  
This, at least, was the reasoning of some national officials. The Court’s ruling in 1/94 
provided the more reluctant Member States with a strong argument, ‘a good shield behind 
which they could hide’. France, for example, repeatedly said that it wished to stress the 
importance it attached to the 1/94 ruling (interview, 1998).  
The role of Presidency is particularly important in the IGC context. The various 
Presidencies did not help much in the Commission’s quest for an extension of the CCP. 
Discussions on the topic started under the Italian Presidency. Italy wasted little political 
energy on the issue and was also not particularly progressive in terms of its substantive   41
approach (cf. Council, 1996b; Italian Presidency, 1996). Although the Irish did not devote 
significantly greater attention to the issue than the Italians, they were generally supportive of 
extending Article 113 which was reflected in several Presidency notes and in its draft Treaty 
(Irish Presidency, 1996d; Council, 1996c). The Dutch Presidency was less supportive than the 
Irish. In its April 1997 text, it proposed QMV and external representation by the Commission 
acting as the sole negotiator, but it also drew up a protocol of exceptions and then wrote ‘...’ 
which was regarded by delegations (and functional ministries) as an invitation for tabling 
further derogations and eventually turned the protocol into a ‘shopping list’ (interview, 1999; 
cf. Dutch Presidency, 1997f). Although there had been underlying ‘protectionist’ tendencies 
by ministries in most Member States throughout the IGC, these were now presented with a 
concrete outlet. Hence, the Dutch Presidency made a considerable misjudgement by 
introducing the ‘shopping-list’ approach, as other options seem to have been available. This 
approach eventually led to the abandoning of discussions on a permanent extension of Article 
113 because the proposed text on Article 113 that was ‘too laborious and draught with 
exceptions [and] a number of participants thought that the value added […] was doubtful’ 
(European Policy Centre, 1997b). 
The European Parliament was lukewarm concerning the Commission’s quest for an 
extension of its competencies under Article 113. It was somewhat critical because the 
Commission proposals at the time did not (explicitly) foresee greater EP involvement. 
Parliamentary resolutions on the IGC were almost silent on the topic.
37 In its most important 
contribution, the Dury/Maji-Weggen IGC Resolution (EP, 1996a), the EP did not mention the 
extension of Article 113 as an explicit aim. The fact that the EP was not outrightly supportive 
may have taken some legitimacy away from the Commission proposal. On the other hand, 
Parliament was very explicit about its own institutional ambitions. It sought the introduction 
of co-decision for Article 113 and to extend assent to all international agreements (EP, 1996a) 
and pursued a quid pro quo strategy, making its support for the Commission conditional on 
having its own demands supported by the Commission. The result was that both institutions 
did not end up fully supporting each other (interview, 1999).  
 
As for the IGC 2000, overall the role played by supranational institutions was slightly 
augmented. The Commission’s assertion and impact on the CCP debate was mixed, although 
it was (somewhat) more effective on this issue than at Amsterdam. The Commission’s ability 
to influence the debate was hampered by the prevailing lack of trust by Member States, 
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stemming from the UR. Although overall this lack of trust had diminished with the departure 
of Sir Leon Brittan as Trade Commissioner, some delegations remained suspicious of the 
Commission in terms of a strict abidance of its mandate and a fair representation of Member 
States’ views at international trade negotiations. New Trade Commissioner Lamy’s (alleged) 
exceedance of his mandate at the Seattle Ministerial Conference by accepting the setting up of 
a biotechnology working group was, therefore, gist on some Member States’ mill (interview, 
2004). However, the Commission managed to establish more cohesion on trade policy as 
compared to the Amsterdam IGC. Lamy and his cabinet, DG Trade, the Legal Service and the 
IGC Task Force all pulled in the same direction and managed to speak with one voice. In 
addition, at the Nice summit the Finnish delegation and the Commission made sure that QMV 
in external trade policy was not completely scrapped. According to some observers, without 
their interventions at the summit, the outcome ‘would have probably been still worse, or even 
remained at the Amsterdam provision.’ Eventually, it was Commissioner Lamy, Finnish 
Permanent Representative Satuli and the Director-General of the Council Legal Service, Piris, 
who worked out the final text at Nice (interview, 2004, also cf. Gray and Stubb, 2001p. 21). 
While the Portuguese Presidency fulfilled its role as an honest broker and furtherer of 
common interests, the French Presidency failed in that respect. The latter can be criticised on 
several accounts. Unlike the Presidency’s expected role, the French did not take an ambitious 
(or at least neutral) approach on the issue and failed to modify its own national interest in the 
search for a far-reaching solution in the ‘European interest’ (or at least for the sake of a 
mutually acceptable compromise). Instead, in the last stages of the IGC, the French 
Presidency insisted on the preservation of unanimity in several sectors, above all cultural 
services. This was, of course, rather inviting for other delegations to oppose the extension of 
QMV in other aspects and areas of the CCP (cf. Lequesne, 2001). The French Presidency can 
also be criticised for a lack of leadership on external trade policy. It failed to gradually narrow 
down the debate towards one option that can be decided upon (see Maurer 2001b, p. 138). 
During the Nice summit there were still at least three different options on the table, which 
substantially inhibited agreement.  
The European Parliament was more supportive of the extension of Article 133 than in 
the Amsterdam IGC. The EP’s stance basically mirrored that of the Commission on the CCP 
and augmenting its role in trade policy became one of its more important objectives. The role 
of Parliament had further augmented from the last IGC. This time the two EP Representatives, 
Brok and Tsatsos, were not only allowed to exchange views with IGC Representatives before 
official meetings, but were allowed to attend the Representatives Group as observers. It has   43
been pointed out that the presence at the Representatives’ negotiating table provided more 
ample opportunity to ‘remind Member States that trade is the only policy area where 
Parliament was not even required to be consulted’, but overall Parliament’s impact on the 
debate has been judged as limited (interviews, 2003, 2004).  
 
During the Convention the role of supranational institutions was further enhanced. As far as 
the Commission is concerned, its influence on external trade policy matters was greater than 
during the Amsterdam and Nice Treaty revisions. Despite the fact that it was represented only 
by two Commissioners – though both were also part of the Praesidium – the Commission 
played a leading role during the Convention (Goulard, 2003, p. 381). This is certainly the case 
for the CCP. Perhaps, most importantly, as pointed out above, the deliberative decision style 
in the Convention meant that the well-founded arguments of the Commission – for example 
on the changing trade agenda – were, in contrast to most IGC negotiations, listened to and 
reflected upon, and that they finally largely prevailed. As one Commission official put it, ‘as 
opposed to the last IGCs, people at the Convention were eager to really discuss the pros and 
cons of more Community competence. [In this kind of environment,] we could finally 
influence the debate because the best arguments made the biggest impact’ (interview, 2004). 
Other factors further contributed to the Commission’s augmented role in the last Treaty 
revision. As during the Nice IGC, cohesion within the Commission was very considerable, 
with the two Commissioners and their cabinets, DG Trade and the Task Force all pulling into 
the same direction. Furthermore, the Commission had invested a lot of attention and political 
capital in the IGC and especially in the Convention. The Commission Task Force was stocked 
up to twelve officials. Contacts were made and cultivated with important, often like-minded, 
actors. During the Convention these included particularly MEPs (leading to mutual support on 
the issue) and Jean-Luc Dehaene who chaired the Working Group on External Action and 
also external relations issues in the Praesidium, and the German and Dutch delegations during 
the IGC. It also helped that the Commission had greater expertise in, and better overview of, 
the subject matter.  
The European Parliament, and particularly its delegation to the Convention, managed 
to assert itself to a much greater extent than during previous Treaty revision negotiations. This 
way, the EP also contributed to the more ambitious outcome on the CCP. At the Convention, 
Parliament was influential for a number of reasons. Firstly, apart from the small Commission 
delegation, the 16 representatives from the EP formed the most coherent and the best   44
organised fraction of the Convention.
38 This is largely due to the fact that EP Convention 
members already possessed institutionalised and functioning working structures to prepare for 
meetings in the framework of the Convention (Maurer 2003b, p. 137). As a result, 
amendments by one EP member were often backed by more than ten MEPs. Secondly, 
representatives of the EP were, apart from the Commission representatives (on some issues), 
the most active fraction in the Convention in terms of making proposals, participating in the 
debate and liaising with other Convention members (Duff 2003, p. 3). The mainstream of the 
EP delegation supported a far-reaching extension of Community competences accompanied 
by a substantial augmentation of Parliament’s involvement. On the latter issue the EP was 
successful for several reasons: in an open and reasoned debate, Parliaments’ arguments were 
bound to make an impact. External trade was the only policy area in which the European 
Parliament had hardly any role. Given the Laeken declaration’s emphasis on legitimacy, the 
EP’s claim became even more convincing. Moreover, in view of the fact that public health 
and consumer issues were increasingly discussed at WTO level, a role for the EP was all the 
more important. Also, despite its virtual exclusion from the making of the CCP, Parliament 
had shown an active interest in trade policy over many years and generally taken a 
constructive approach (Bender, 2002). 
  The role played by the various Presidencies had a moderate impact on the CCP 
outcome. The Belgian Presidency in the second half of 2001 was, along with the EP, the 
Commission and some Member States, a strong supporter of convening a Convention for the 
preparation of the IGC. The Belgian Presidency has particularly been credited for reaching 
agreement, despite considerable reservations, on a very broad mandate for the Convention 
(see Göler, 2002, p. 4). External trade policy as well as many other policy areas would have 
probably fallen prey to a more restricted mandate. The Italian and Dutch Presidencies that 
were held during the IGC 2003-04 had little impact on the external trade dossier that was 
hardly touched during the negotiations. 
  Due to the bonding strength of the Convention provision (and the dynamics behind the 
extension of Article 133), the IGC negotiating infrastructure which facilitates defending the 
status quo and hampers enforcing change, for once, worked in the Commission’s (and EP’s) 
favour. Any changes to the provisions on the table had to be supported by very substantial 
political impetus. This was successfully obstructed by the Commission which particularly 
cultivated relations with the governments of Germany and the Netherlands who became allies 
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rather ‘eurosceptic’ views.   45
in preventing the CCP from being watered down during the IGC. The EP – now endowed 
with speaking rights at all sessions – actively contributed to the Commission-led endeavour to 
prevent a thinning out of the CCP provisions (interview, 2004). 
 
 
Countervailing forces 
 
So far we have looked at the potential dynamics of integration. On the other side of the 
equation we have countervailing pressures impacting on the decision-making process. Firstly, 
domestic constraints provide some useful insights for explaining the restrictive outcome of 
Amsterdam. The new trade issues do not stop at the borders, such as issues of tariffs and 
quotas, but extend behind borders into the state and thus concern national laws and domestic 
regulation (e.g. Smith and Woolcock, 1999, pp. 440-41). Hence, these issues also tend to be 
more politicised. To shed competences to the Community under these circumstances is more 
difficult. For example, during the IGC negotiation France asked for a derogation on cultural 
services in order to safeguard its cultural diversity policy behind which there is strong public 
support and strong lobbies. Domestic constraints in some goods issues also affected the 
debate on the extension of competence concerning the new trade issues. One way of avoiding 
QMV on agriculture or textiles – which are substantially politicised issues in France and 
Portugal respectively – in horizontal trade negotiations was to keep unanimity for the new 
trade issues, as one aspect decided by unanimity in horizontal trade negotiations leads to 
unanimity on the whole package.  
Secondly, there is the more diffuse issue of sovereignty-consciousness which 
constituted another strong countervailing pressure during the IGC 1996-97. The intrusion of 
the new trade issues into domestic spheres close to the heart of national sovereignty had 
increased the sensitivity in terms of delegating powers to the Community on these issues. 
Meunier and Nicolaïdis (1999, pp. 485-87) have shown that several countries, including 
France and the UK, came out against an extension of Community competence, contrary to 
their national interest, and joined the ‘sovereignty camp’, largely on ideological grounds. Both 
France and the UK are very competitive internationally in terms of trade in commercial 
services and have a positive trade balance in this sector. Their interest would have been best 
served by a Community with exclusive trade competence, since its collective negotiating 
position cannot be held up by the Member State least ready to confront international 
competition. Also in the case of Denmark, the traditional ideological bias against an 
expansion of Community competence outweighed its traditional liberal stance (cf. Meunier   46
and Nicolaïdis, 1999). The phenomenon of bureaucratic politics is also relevant here as 
officials in national ministries became agents of sovereignty-consciousness. This ideological 
basis for opposing a progressive reform of Article 113 have been strongly spurred by the 
distrust  vis-à-vis the Commission. Moreover, sovereignty-consciousness has been further 
legitimated and reinforced by the ECJ opinion in 1/94 and the introduction of the shopping-
list approach which provided an outlet for bureaucratic pressures.  
Finally, there is the diffuse pressure of the general anti-integrationist climate
39 which 
arose in the early to mid-1990s and is reflected in less pro-European popular opinions and 
more sceptical media coverage of the EU in some countries. Part of this anti-integrationist 
climate has been a closer scrutiny of the competencies of the Commission, which for many 
had become an aloof, high-handed, and politically unaccountable institution (Papademetriou, 
1996, p. 63). In view of this predominant climate, it was always going to be difficult for the 
Commission to upgrade its competencies on external trade during the IGC 1996-97. All in all, 
countervailing pressures manifested as (very) substantial during the Amsterdam IGC. 
 
Inertia forces remained at a similarly high level during the IGC 2000. Sovereignty-
consciousness continued to feature importantly: France, the UK and Denmark were little 
inclined to delegate competence to the Commission for ideological reasons. Sovereignty-
consciousness was partly, but to a lesser extent than during the previous IGC, reinforced by 
some remaining lack of trust in the Commission, which also raised further doubts concerning 
delegating powers to the Commission in France but also in countries like Portugal and 
Greece. Sovereignty-consciousness sparked by some Commission distrust can, to a large 
extent, explain provisions on unanimity for areas where this decision-mode is required 
internally (to prevent potential Commission attempts to introduce liberalisation through the 
back door) and also partly the unanimity requirement for horizontal agreements with which 
some governments felt more ‘at ease’ (interviews, 2004). The insistence of France on the 
‘cultural exception’ is partly illuminated by the specificity of French national identity, the 
perceived threat to this identity and the importance of culture therein. In terms of French 
perceptions of national identity, no loss of sovereignty in such sensitive areas as culture could 
be accepted (cf. e.g. Le Monde, 31/10/2000, p. 31).  
On specific trade policy issues, bureaucratic politics played an important role. For 
example, it has been reported that officials at the French Ministry of Economy, Finance and 
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Industry blocked the issue of investment to come under the scope of Article 133. Moreover, 
officials from Dutch, UK, Danish, Greek, German and Austrian national transport ministries 
are said to have been very reluctant to introduce QMV for trade in transport services, mainly 
in order to avoid having to cede competence to their respective economic ministries. As for 
the Netherlands and the UK, the perceived competitive advantages of these countries in air 
transport services under the current regime played an even bigger role, prompting a defence of 
their constituents’ interests (interview, 2004). 
  This brings us to the role of domestic constraints. These have played an important role 
here as trade negotiations were increasingly coming to concern matters traditionally seen as 
part of domestic policy (Rollo and Holmes, 2001). For example, the unfortunate, cautious as 
well as defensive role by the French Presidency on the CCP, particularly on cultural services 
can be further explicated by domestic constraints. Within the context of cohabitation and 
looming elections in 2002, neither Chirac, nor Jospin could allow to be viewed as giving in on 
such an important issue as cultural diversity (interview, 2004; cf Lequesne, 2001). Hence, 
their ‘competition’ significantly contributed to such minimalist French/Presidency position, 
especially on trade in cultural services.
 Domestic constraints further mattered on the latter 
issue, as many of the about 4.5 million jobs in the French cultural sectors would be 
endangered through WTO level liberalisation. The issue of culture also became such a strong 
countervailing pressure because of diversity, or more precisely due to French distinctness. 
Distinct French national identity and particular structures of its economy did not allow France 
to give up its veto in this domain. In addition, the importance of the agricultural sector in 
France, backed by strong lobbies, adds to the sovereignty-consciousness explanation on the 
unanimity requirement for horizontal agreements (see above). Finally, the integrationist 
climate remained at a similarly low level as during the previous Treaty revision. 
 
During the Convention phase countervailing pressures were much weaker than during an IGC. 
There are several reasons for this: firstly, due to the absence of inter-departmental 
coordination, representatives of national governments were not curbed by the influence of 
various functional ministries. Bureaucrats, who have been identified as important agents of 
sovereignty consciousness and also constitute a principal source of domestic constraints, were 
thus largely shut out from the process. Secondly, although the members arrived at the 
Convention with certain domestic or institutional socialisations and frames guiding their 
behaviour, all in all, they were able to negotiate freely without significant restrictions (cf. 
Maurer, 2003, pp. 134-37). As a result, domestic factors – while constituting important   48
sources of information and feedback mechanisms – were far less constraining for members of 
the Convention than for negotiators in an IGC. Regarding external trade policy, the strongest 
countervailing pressures during the Convention were domestic constraints faced by (and 
through) French members on the issue of cultural diversity. This pressure mounted when the 
draft texts of April, May and June 2003 did not provide for a French cultural exception (Le 
Monde, 16/05/2003). Largely as a result of this pressure, the Praesidium decided after the 
Thessaloniki European Council to include the cultural exception, as otherwise it would have 
been very difficult for the French government to support the Draft Constitutional Treaty. 
The greatly reduced countervailing pressures also had an impact, beyond the 
Convention, on the entire Treaty revision exercise. Due to the considerable bonding strength 
of the Convention described above, the results of the Convention had a much greater 
significance than normal IGC pre-negotiations or preparation exercises. When the IGC 
formally began in October 2003, countervailing pressures, for example through national 
ministries, gathered greater strength. As far as the CCP is concerned, these had little chance to 
register as the Convention text on Article 133 was, by and large, the result of a strong and 
genuine consensus, of which either Foreign Ministers (themselves) or representatives of 
Heads of State and Government had been part. Given this situation, for countervailing forces 
to make an impact on the provisions, they had to be stronger than during ‘normal’ IGC 
negotiations. On the whole, the countervailing forces which impacted on the CCP were 
weaker than during former IGCs. Distrust of the Commission had further waned. This was 
partly because more than ten years had passed since the most controversial events during the 
UR which had given rise to this distrust. In addition, pressure from functional departments 
endangering the CCP compromise was less intense than during previous Treaty revisions. 
This is to a certain extent attributable to the fact that the IGC was largely conducted on the 
political level and partly because of its relative short duration, as a result of which it was more 
difficult for departments to have their voices heard in the formation of national positions. 
The strongest countervailing pressure during the IGC on the CCP issue came from the 
Swedish and Finnish delegations. They sought (and obtained) a narrow exception to qualified 
QMV in the field of trade in social, education and health services. The two delegations argued 
that their domestic high-quality provisions concerning these services could be prejudiced by 
an international agreement in these areas. The Swedish and Finnish reservations to QMV in 
these domains can be explained by a mix of sovereignty consciousness and domestic 
constraints and diversities. The issue of trade in ‘public’ services was raised by various 
national Parliamentarians (from various parties) in the Finnish Parliament during the   49
Convention and IGC and thus effectively tied the hands of the government, which of course 
needs to go through Parliament to ratify the Treaty. The Swedish situation was similar. The 
issue of social, education and health services became part of the Swedish IGC paper and was 
approved by the Swedish Parliament. In addition, the (ideological and sovereignty conscious) 
maxim that public services should remain in state control was widely accepted in the Swedish 
government (less so by the Conservative opposition). In addition, the new Finnish 
government led by the Centre Party was perhaps less Europhile than the Lipponen 
government, certainly with regard to the issue of external trade competences, and thus took a 
more sovereignty conscious approach (interview, 2005). The countervailing forces that 
threatened the successful conclusion of the IGC as a whole during the autumn and winter 
2003/2004 have been analysed and described elsewhere (Niemann, 2005 forthcoming). 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
All in all, my framework has provided a robust account for an analysis of the past three Treaty 
revisions on the reform of the Common Commercial Policy. The hypothesised pressures can 
aptly explain variation in outcomes across cases, including why a genuine extension of 
competencies occurred at the last Treaty revision, after prior IGCs had largely been 
unsuccessful in that respect. 
  I argue that the failure to modernise Article 113 at the Amsterdam IGC can be 
explained here as the result of overall weak dynamics combined with strong countervailing 
pressures. Exogenous pressures, especially those stemming from the changing trade agenda 
that increasingly included the newer trade issues, constituted the strongest dynamic. However, 
these were not sufficiently convincing to a minority of reluctant Member States. Functional 
arguments stemming from the internal market were less pressing and had been rejected by the 
Court in its opinion 1/94. In addition, the role of organised interests never really caught on to 
the idea of widening the scope of external trade policy, while socialisation and learning 
processes were offset by several factors. Moreover, EU institutions barely fostered the issue, 
and at times even hindered an extension of the CCP. On the side of countervailing factors, 
there was above all the issue of sovereignty-consciousness, complemented by domestic 
constraints due to increasing politicisation of the new trade issues and a diffuse anti-
integrationist climate.    50
The IGC 2000 negotiations were generally characterised by stronger dynamics. 
Exogenous pressures were as strong as at Amsterdam, if not stronger, due to the further 
development of the world trade agenda. Functional pressures stemming from the internal 
market, and from enlargement, had also become more substantial. The assertion of 
supranational institutions (e.g. through the Commission) had also grown slightly. On the other 
hand, organised interests as well as socialisation and learning processes among governmental 
elites remained at about the same low/modest level as during the IGC 1996-97. I argue that, in 
combination, these dynamics can explain the extension of QMV. These pressures were 
countered by a number of inertia forces that were of similar strength as during the Amsterdam 
IGC. While suspicion in the Commission – an important factor at the IGC 1996-97 – had 
decreased, the politicisation of some issues in the domestic context had somewhat grown. 
During the last Treaty revision integrational dynamics were considerably stronger. 
Exogenous pressures from a changing world economy and an evolving world trade agenda, as 
well as functional rationales, particularly through enlargement, provided important structural 
pressures. These two structural pressures could register with actors, and unfold their strengths 
more easily because of stronger socialisation, deliberation and learning processes. Such 
processes, as a result of which actors concurred with the results, can also largely explain the 
bonding strength of the Convention text. These dynamics were further reinforced by the 
stronger role played by organised interests and, more importantly, supranational institutions. 
Largely due to the Convention framework, inertia forces were (substantially) weaker than at 
the Amsterdam and Nice IGCs. This facilitated the stronger ignition and dissemination of 
integrational dynamics.  
 
 
Table 1: Summary of hypothesised pressures and outcomes across (sub-)cases   51
 
 
Arguably, the framework, especially through its dialectical nature (combining both dynamics 
and countervailing factors) enables us to account for more specific aspects of decision 
outcomes. For example, during the last Treaty revision, the strong overall dynamics combined 
with only moderate to medium countervailing forces, can explain the extension of Community 
competence. The most important of these countervailing forces were the relatively strong 
domestic constraints and elements of sovereignty consciousness in France (concerning cultural 
diversity) and in Sweden and Finland (regarding social, health and educational services), The 
Treaty thus contained only few exceptions, including the ‘derogations’ for France as well as 
Sweden and Finland. 
(Sub-)case 
 
Pressures 
CCP 
1996-97 
CCP 
2000 
CCP 
2002-04 
Functional 
pressures 
 
Low  Medium  Medium to 
High 
Exogenous 
pressures 
 
Medium to 
High  High  High 
Socialisation, 
deliberation and  
learning 
Low  Low  Medium to 
High 
The role of  
organised interests 
 
Low  Low  Low to 
Medium 
The role of  
supranational 
institutions 
Low 
(Low to) 
Medium 
(Medium to) 
High 
 
Dynamics 
(combined) 
 
 
Weak 
 
 
 
Medium  Strong 
Countervailing  
forces 
(combined) 
 
Strong 
 
Strong 
 
 
 
Weak to 
Medium 
Outcome 
(in terms of 
level/scope) 
Low  Low to 
Medium 
(Medium to) 
High   52
My empirical analysis has indicated that dynamics and countervailing forces can not 
always be clearly separated from each other. They impact on one another during the (decision-
making) interaction and thus already restrain each others’ impact. For example, socialisation, 
deliberation and learning processes may be reduced by countervailing forces such as domestic 
constraints (and sovereignty-consciousness). On the other hand, socialisation and learning 
processes also, to some extent, soften up sovereignty-consciousness and also curtail domestic 
constraints and diversities, since national elites are increasingly Europeanised and the EU (as 
well as interaction on the European level) contributes to the construction of their preferences and 
identities. On a general level one can also say that different structural pressures inform and 
constitute decision-makers’ interests and attitudes, such as endogenous-functional, exogenous 
and domestic structures, which suggests that dynamics and countervailing forces check and 
balance each other on many levels. However, these processes are notoriously difficult to capture 
empirically. 
Closely related to the previous point, pressures that have been hypothesised as dynamics 
may (under certain conditions) turn into countervailing forces and vice versa. For example, 
during the IGC 1996-97 we have witnessed that the anticipation of functional pressures may be 
detrimental in the search for far-reaching solutions. In addition, during the same (sub)-case the 
roles of the Commission and the Council Presidency, which are usually viewed here as important 
driving forces, ended up nurturing bureaucratic countervailing pressures due to the distrust of the 
Commission and the clumsy (e.g. shopping-list) approach of the Dutch Presidency. Elsewhere, I 
have described how inertia forces can turn into dynamics, for example through the convergence 
of domestic preferences/constraints (cf. Niemann, 2005 forthcoming). 
  After having underlined the overall plausibility of the framework – while 
acknowledging certain conceptual simplifications – I will now briefly look at the causal 
relevance of individual hypothesised pressures by making use of a comparative analysis.
40 
Firstly, we can identify and isolate the causal processes that lead to different outcomes (Ragin, 
1987, p. 47). One way of advancing this method is to examine whether hypothesised pressures 
co-vary with outcomes. Changing levels of progressiveness in terms of outcome would 
corroborate those dynamics changing as hypothesised, and challenge those remaining constant or 
changing in the direction opposite to the one hypothesised. In other words, higher values on the 
decision outcome (or on the overall dynamics) would confirm those dynamics that also display 
higher scores, and challenge the causal relevance of those decreasing or remaining constant. By 
                                                 
40 A comparative analysis of six independent variables across three cases can of course under most circumstances 
generate only indeterminate results. While this is acknowledged here, it is also worth pointing out that a broader 
analysis with seven cases has brought about very similar results (Niemann, 2005 forthcoming).   53
including countervailing pressures in the revised neofunctionalist framework, an additional layer 
of complexity has been introduced: dynamics may not co-vary with outcomes in a linear fashion 
due to strong inertia forces. Hence, although the rule still applies, that increased measures of 
causally relevant dynamics should lead to higher scores on the dependent variable, 
countervailing forces may lessen or dilute dynamics. Therefore, as a first step, it was ascertained, 
if individual dynamics co-vary with the values of the combined dynamics (Table 1: third row 
from bottom). And as a second step, I investigated whether individual dynamics co-varied with 
the overall outcome of the sub-case in question, while taking the impact of countervailing forces 
into consideration. Through closer examination of Table 1 we can see that functional pressures 
and the role of supranational institutions, and to a somewhat lesser extent, socialisation, 
deliberation and learning processes as well as the role of organised interests, co-vary with the 
scores determined for the combined dynamics. When looking at final outcomes – while taking 
account of countervailing forces – this trend is also confirmed.  
The causal significance of individual pressures can be ascertained particularly well in 
those cases where all but a few hypothesised causal variables are constant. Here, it can be seen 
whether the remaining pressures changed in the direction of the combined dynamics/overall 
outcome. Unfortunately, the distribution of variables across my cases does not give much scope 
for such an analysis. The first two CCP sub-cases (CCP 1996-97 and CCP 2000) allow for some 
limited use of this technique. In both units socialisation, deliberation and learning processes as 
well as the role of organised interests have been ranked as ‘low’. Hence, we have ‘isolated’ 
functional and exogenous pressures as well as the role of supranational institutions to account for 
the change from a ‘weak’ to a ‘medium’ score for the combined dynamics. The three pressures 
do, in fact, display higher measures on the second case, which substantiates their relevance. 
  Given my theoretical framework and the resulting isolation of countervailing forces as a 
variable, the most conclusive comparative analysis can be made in terms of these countervailing 
forces. Their causal significance can be measured directly when compared with outcomes in 
consideration of the values taken by the combined dynamics. In the cases CCP 1996-97 and CCP 
2000, ‘strong’ countervailing forces led to ‘minimal’ or ‘minimal to medium’ decision outcomes, 
while ‘weak to medium’ countervailing forces are accompanied by a ‘medium to high’ decision 
outcome (CCP 2002-04). The analysis of these cases becomes even more conclusive when the 
combined dynamics are taken into account. It indicates that countervailing forces tend to tame 
dynamics, depending on the values taken by inertia forces (and dynamics) (cf. Table 1).  
  Exogenous pressure merits a brief discussion. In the CCP 1996-97 sub-case ‘medium to 
high’ scores only induced rather modest overall dynamics and the case is also characterised by a   54
minimal outcome, which may challenge the causal relevance of this pressure. Regarding the case 
in question, other more agency-related pressures were, however, rather weak. As mentioned 
earlier, structural pressures can only really make an impact in combination with (strong) agency. 
Hence, we can conclude that the integrational logic tends to increase most when structural and 
more actor-based dynamics pressures are (substantially) activated. 
Instead of theorising about the integration project and process as a whole, this 
framework seeks to explain particular decision-making instances or processes. However, my 
findings may allow for some more general informed guesses, and suggest that the integration 
process will further continue, both in terms of level and scope of integration. Inertia forces are 
likely – at least from time to time – to be insufficiently strong to counterbalance the 
integrational dynamics. And the IGC 2000 case suggests that even strong countervailing 
forces may not completely tame the dynamics of integration.  
The tentativeness of parts of the preceding analysis (e.g. on socialisation and learning 
processes or the specification of conditions for occurrence and impact of pressures), the 
possibility of greater specification regarding the causal relevance of hypothesised pressures 
(e.g. which ones are merely conducive and which ones necessary) and the existence of further 
potential shortcomings, suggest that there is substantial ground for further research emanating 
from this study. 
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